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information and patterns to answer the research question and support of the argument that 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, stakeholders of the critical infrastructure 
sectors have tried to identify infrastructure vulnerabilities. The food and agricultural 
sector is no exception to this evaluation. While stakeholders and researchers recognize 
the importance of the food/agricultural industry as a critical infrastructure, few studies 
have addressed how to protect the infrastructure from intentional attacks. Since 
September 11 and the Bush administration’s declaration of a “War on Terror,” there has 
been scant research on the intelligence and information needs for the agricultural/food 
infrastructure. With many incidents of food-related illnesses in recent years and current 
recognition that the food and agriculture infrastructure is critical to national security, 
there has been much discussion about the need to explore changes in the U.S. food and 
agriculture regulatory system.  
Many are concerned that the system, as now framed, is inefficient and not well 
prepared to handle the challenges of potential intentional contamination of the nation’s 
food supply. Discussions often focus on the complexity of the regulatory structure and 
questions about its inability to handle and control the number of unintentional 
contamination problems adequately that have occurred in recent years. The U.S. 
regulatory structure, with its many agencies and departments and their respective 
responsibilities in protection of the food infrastructure, was created around the turn of the 
20th century. Over the years, an accumulation of legislation has added to the inefficiency 
of the regulatory system. Refocus on protecting our nation’s critical infrastructures from 
terrorism has led to a debate about whether it is time to revisit the food and agricultural 




B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can the U.S. food safety/defense systems be improved to meet the challenges 
of protecting the food/agricultural sector from both unintentional and intentional food-
related illnesses in an ever-expanding global food supply? Does the present system need 
to be restructured? If yes, how do we design a system to support the concept of a single 
food safety/defense agency in the United States?  
Ancillary to the initial research questions is whether the leadership of the United 
States and of the food safety regulatory system will meet the challenge to explore 
innovative concepts related to a new food regulatory structure. Any solution that answers 
these questions would require an innovative and practical structure designed to bring 
about consolidation of smart practices, best knowledge in food safety, and a more 
effective management of resources and budget. 
C. THE LITERATURE 
1. Initial Findings 
Most of the documents available in the literature are government and think tank 
reports that address the critical importance of the food/agriculture sector. Most of these 
documents are from the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), RAND Corporation, the Institute of Medicine, National 
Research Council (IOM/NRC), the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), and 
the Heritage Foundation. It is interesting that these documents often offer similar views, 
recommendations, and information about the food/agricultural sector and the U.S. food 
safety regulatory structure (Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 2008). 
Numerous documents, both recent and dated, include information about the 
food/agricultural sector, the food safety regulatory system, and an abundance of 
suggestions for change.  
Before September 11, 2001, there remained little published about the vulnerability 
of the infrastructure to terrorism and the national security issue implications of an attack 
on the food and agriculture sector. One pre-9/11 research report from the RAND 
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Corporation did address the vulnerability of the infrastructure and attempted to focus 
concern that the sector could be targeted by terrorists with the goals of economic 
destabilization, political gain, and fear (Chalk, 2001). After September 11, 2001, reports 
on issues about the criticality of the food infrastructure, enhanced food safety efforts 
(food security and food defense), and their significance to homeland security issues 
began to appear with more frequency. It was not until the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security in 2002 (Revision in October 2007) and the January 31, 2004 release 
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 that the highest levels of government in 
the United States finally started to focus on the importance of the food/agricultural 
infrastructure to the nation’s sustainability and the criticality of the infrastructure. 
However, even the release of the 2002 strategy did not present an immediate direction 
about preparation of the sector to prevent attacks or for information sharing between the 
regulatory and private sector communities to protect it from intentional attacks (White 
House, 2002). 
As mentioned, food and agriculture has not always been recognized as a critical 
infrastructure vulnerable to terrorist attacks. For example, terrorism analyst Peter Chalk 
wrote that the infrastructure was not listed as critical in the Clinton administration’s 
Presidential Decision Directive 63, one of the first directives to identify the nation’s 
critical infrastructures, being complete left out (Chalk, 2004). Peter Chalk wrote in the 
same 2004-RAND report:  
Agriculture and food production and supply, however, are industries that 
have received comparatively little attention in the general field of 
counterterrorism and homeland security. In terms of accurate threat 
assessments and consequence management procedures, the agricultural 
sector is somewhat of a latecomer to the growing emphasis on critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) in the United States. (Chalk, 2004)  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of U.S. Agriculture and 
Food (HSPD-9) discussed the food infrastructure as a critical infrastructure that, while 




(White House, 2004). HSPD-9 brought to the forefront the need for development of 
intelligence and analysis capabilities to include collection and analysis of threat, delivery, 
and methods information directed to the food and agriculture sector.  
In the 17 months of research completed for this thesis, members of the media, 
consumer groups, industry Web sites and associated documents have also called for a 
new food safety regulatory course. The primary call has been for improvements in how 
the United States regulates the food/agricultural infrastructure. Concern for the safety and 
now defense of the infrastructure has grown because of incidents of biological 
contamination in processed and raw foods and agricultural products, from both the 
domestic and foreign food supply chains. These same organizations and groups have 
linked these foodborne illness outbreaks to inadequacies in the network of regulatory 
agencies that are responsible for the infrastructure’s protection (Marler Clark, Food 
Poison Journal, 2008). The increases in illnesses that have occurred from ingestion of 
these food products by humans and pets have begun to heighten concerns about how we 
protect our food supply. 
Some members of Congress have attempted a legislative dialogue and called for 
changes to the U.S. food safety regulatory structure. While perhaps a coincidence since 
September 11, foodborne illness outbreaks associated with products such as spinach, 
lettuce, tomatoes, jalapeno peppers and peanut butter, imported seafood and pet food 
from China have brought attention to global security and protection of the food supply 
from terrorists beyond our borders (Fischetti, 2007). If terrorism is linked to biological 
and chemical incidents, the consequences to the U.S. population, the food industry, and 
our national economy could be devastating. The cost of the Salmonella Saintpaul-related 
illness associated with tomatoes and jalapeno peppers to the industry in August 2008 was 
estimated between $130 million to $150 million, with 1,442 people ill, 286 hospitalized, 
and two deaths as a result (Hsu, 2008). Information and reports like the above 




The same private think tanks such as RAND and government agency reporting 
services, such as GAO and CRS, have also recommended a move away from the structure 
of multiple agencies and departments now responsible for the safety of different 
components in the nation’s food supply. Additional reports call for a new direction and 
need for protection of the agricultural/food infrastructure against terrorists. 
Evidence showing the intentions of international terrorists to target agriculture 
and food was found in Afghanistan in Operation Anaconda in 2002 (Williams, 2005). 
Documents found showed the expressed desire of Al Qaeda to contaminate food, 
agricultural and water supplies. These documents also present confirmation of terrorist 
intentions to use the infrastructure for terror. The documents prove the need to suggest to 
U.S. leaders that a re-evaluation of our strategies in allocation of resources and best 
practices in food safety that also include a viable intelligence component being added to 
any regulatory structure.  
2. Conclusion 
The literature reveals that while the importance of the food infrastructure has been 
gradually moving forward in respect to homeland security, there remain gaps in how the 
current agencies handle intelligence information on the sector and how it is distributed to 
those who need it most. The literature does include formal science-based information 
about the nature of biological, chemical, and radiological threats and contaminants and 
the consequences of not protecting the food supply. Information is plentiful about 
pathogens and their interactions with food. What is missing, however, is information 
about food safety for homeland security purposes. 
The industry, while supportive of the concept of food defense generated after 
September 11, may have difficulty embracing a separation between food safety and food 
defense especially with multiple agencies. Industry stakeholders may believe that without 
information suggesting an increased level of intentional threat that current safety 
precautions are sufficient to protect the food products that they produce. Facilities that are 
inspected by more than one federal or state regulatory agency may have one agency 
suggest or regulate by statute one direction on food defense, as they do on food safety of 
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specific commodities, while the other agency, per their statute, goes in another direction.1 
Many documents explain how the food safety regulatory system works. Some authors say 
that the system and processes do not need change, while others suggest enhancements to 
the system by tweaking budgets, adding laws and statutes, or wholesale changes through 
creation of a new regulatory structure. Some authors discuss whether anything the 
government does will be sufficient to protect consumers, create transparency, or be too 
restrictive to the industry being regulated both foreign and domestic. 
However, how do we get to a collective agreement on the move toward a 
modernized food protection regulatory system in the United States? In addition, why 
would we want to move in this direction if given the chance?  
D. ARGUMENT 
Establishment of a single food safety oversight agency could help close one of 
many important gaps. Such an agency can establish a single portal for a smarter and more 
efficient and focused use of resources for food safety/defense. A focused and combined 
regulatory approach to food safety/defense efforts can be established for the sector. This 
approach would establish a more focused mechanism for research of food and 
agricultural pathogens, including emerging pathogens. Better education at all levels of the 
farm-to-table continuum on food safety/defense involving all stakeholders, combined 
with the fusion of intelligence information pertinent to the food and agricultural sector, 
would also provide a clearer perspective of existing and emergent problems and provide a 
path to strengthen outcome solutions. Additionally, it is important to explore a workable 
solution or policy for information sharing between the regulatory system, DHS, the 
intelligence community, and ultimately, the state and local regulatory systems to analyze 
probabilities of attack and prevent terrorist threats against the sector. The importance of  
 
 
                                                 
1 My experience as a state regulatory, as we moved toward an educational campaign to let retail food 
service establishment operators know about the concept of food defense, helps to strengthen this statement. 
When the federal system started discussion of the need to secure and defend the food and agricultural 
infrastructure, the primary federal food regulatory authorities went from food security to food defense 
terminology before settling and agreeing to use the term food defense.  
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all of these will require a new direction. Exploration of this new direction is the basis for 
establishing a different concept, which will be discussed in this thesis of an 
administrative agency dedicated to singular oversight of food safety/defense. 
Can something be done to bring all of the resources available among the various 
agencies together within the confines of current statutes and laws that govern the various 
food safety agencies? There is plenty of discussion occurring with the current rash of 
food-related illness outbreaks. The illnesses associated with the outbreaks have focused 
for the moment, lawmakers’ attention on examination of the problem, and whether it is 
self-healing under the present system, or whether the system requires fundamental 
change. There is a great deal of blame and frustration among stakeholders on how 
agencies can do better, which agency is in charge of safeguarding what component of the 
food and agriculture sector, and how agencies can share what information and when. The 
arguments for solutions and the questions and answers continue, often repeating the same 
ones continually. What can be done, and who can best filter out a workable solution from 
the myriad of questions and answers being discussed for so long? It all begins with the 
first question. 
1. The Food and Agriculture Regulatory System—Who’s on First? 
The U.S. food safety system is set up from the top down, federal to state to local. 
These agencies are comprised of primary federal agencies such as the FDA, USDA, and 
EPA, and for surveillance of diseases associated with food and water, the CDC. At the 
state level, state and local agencies (depending on the state) regulate the safety of the 
food and water supply, investigation and surveillance of food-related disease outbreaks, 
and respond in their respective jurisdictions. Regulatory agencies at all levels (federal, 
state, and local) of the food/agricultural sector rely on the cooperation and knowledge of 
the food industry, research, and academic components in the food supply chain. 
Unintentional foodborne illnesses in the food infrastructure and supply chain have led to 
confusion as to who is protecting what, how the regulatory system is set up, who is in 
charge of what, and why there is such difficulty in finding the sources of foodborne 
illnesses when they occur. It leads some to imagine a scenario of “Who’s on first? What’s 
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on second? And I don’t know is on third” (Abbott & Costello, 1939). The complex nature 
of product regulation, foodborne illness investigations, and tracing back to the source of 
contamination leads to frustration among consumers and the media as to why distinct 
illness outbreaks are not contained and the source of the contamination determined and 
eliminated more quickly. On the question of possible intentional contamination of food, it 
is difficult to gain adequate buy-in from industry about the potential threat of terrorist 
activities against the food supply without credible intelligence to motivate the industry to 
spend additional money to protect against a terrorist threat. It has been difficult enough to 
prevent unintentional contamination. 
2. From “I Don’t Know”—To Better Understanding 
This thesis will examine whether there is a need for strategic policy 
recommendations that can provide guidance for structural improvement of the U.S. food 
safety regulatory system. We will explore concepts that could break down barriers 
between the parties that can obstruct effective protection of the food supply. This thesis is 
not intended to diminish the hard work that agencies and departments are presently 
putting forth in their current roles as protectors of the nation’s food supply. With 28 years 
of experience in the food regulation industry at the state level, I recognize that current 
laws or statutes require agencies at all levels to perform their duties as well as they can 
with the resources they have, based on legal requirements.  
This thesis will present the argument that the structure can be combined into one 
central federal governmental agency to produce a more effective agency and better 
regulatory oversight and collaboration among federal, state, and local agencies. A single 
food safety agency can also build a stronger foundation for better consistency of message 
and use of resources to educate and train stakeholders in how we protect and defense the 
food supply. 
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. Future Research Efforts 
This thesis will provide an additional literature resource that can be used to 
investigate future questions. Additional research performed after this thesis is needed to 
examine whether terrorist threats from international sources to the food/agricultural 
sector are significant. Intelligence information on intentional contamination is needed to 
explore whether significant gaps exist because of a lack of expert knowledge about 
sector-specific threats. What policies and strategies are absent? What improvements are 
needed for preparation against threats, with the ultimate goal of protection of the food 
and agricultural sector from intentional threats? It is hoped that this thesis will open up a 
future research dialogue and provide guidance to future policy and strategy for protection 
of the food and agricultural sector.  
2. The Immediate Consumer 
Immediate consumers are defined as all stakeholders interested in continual 
improvements in food safety/defense within the food and agricultural infrastructure. The 
list of immediate consumers includes federal, state, and local food safety/defense 
regulatory agency leaders and personnel responsible for overall food safety, and the 
Department of Homeland Security, which is tasked with homeland security and food 
defense coordination in the event of an intentional attack on the infrastructure. In any 
system, all are responsible for implementation of strategy and policy for protection of the 
food and agriculture sectors.  
Equally important stakeholders include the industry, academic research 
institutions, law enforcement at all levels (for intentional threats), consumer groups that 
focus on food safety, and ultimately, the U.S. consumers who keep all of the nation’s 
infrastructures running. This research will give these consumers a better understanding of 




supply. Consumers have an equally important role in the protection of the food supply 
and protection from food-related illnesses. This is the importance of education and 
transparency in food safety and protection. 
3. Homeland Security Practitioners and Leaders Nationally 
The significance of the research from this thesis to homeland security 
practitioners and leaders will be the impetus it places on the decision and policymakers to 
become better strategic planners, informed about the criticality of the food/agriculture 
sector and to understand what modifications to existing food protection regulatory 
structures are warranted. With better understanding of the nature of the threat, probing 
into the myriad of choices based on intellectual awareness and insightful information, 
these decision-makers should be able to achieve realistic goals and a manageable 
structure for the food and agricultural regulatory and industry sector in the homeland 
security environment. A positive movement forward and collective change to the food 
safety/defense structure in the United States will be beneficial to all. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. The Problem 
The issue surrounding change to the current regulatory structure is a sensitive 
topic. With over 100 years in development of the current regulatory food safety structure, 
discussions of change to that system are not always well received. When choosing a 
method of research for the primary research questions, problem statement, and argument 
posed in the thesis, the original intent was to conduct interviews with subject matter 
experts with a vested interest in the food safety and food defense paradigm. The difficulty 
in a method of analysis based on interviews to a research question related to change to the 
food safety regulatory structure was the reluctance by some government officials within 
regulatory structures to discuss questions about change and this method proved futile. 
Other stakeholders within the food and agricultural industry, while willing to discuss the  
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issue were not certain that the discourse through interview was appropriate from their 
position, without discretionary anonymity. While anonymity was affirmed, there was still 
reluctance to participate. 
2. Method Used and Why 
With the above in mind, it was important to choose a method that would allow for 
an objective and balanced approach to the research questions, while maintaining the rigor 
required of research. While there are several alternative methods of research available 
beyond interviews, the method chosen was secondary qualitative analysis. The majority 
of information and literature surrounding food safety and now food defense issues and 
associated regulatory issues are rooted in government research, private think tanks, and 
consumer advocacy group reports. The use of secondary qualitative analysis is 
appropriate in several ways as a research method.  
Secondary analysis of qualitative data allows for the utilization of existing data or 
research on the issue of change to the way the United States protects the food supply. 
Secondary analysis of qualitative data from research reports and literature allows a 
similar analysis and evaluation of the data linked to the research question as that of 
interviews and similar research methods, but is not limited to a question set that may 
require additional interviews. Government, private think tank, and consumer group 
research and reports also allow a look across a wide spectrum of the stakeholder 
community. The method allows the author the opportunity to research objectively the 
questions posed without influence of opinion as a regulatory stakeholder himself. 
Secondary qualitative analysis also allows the use of other methods incorporated 
into the overarching approach of the method, such as the use of comparative qualitative 
data. Through this approach, the research can include an exploration of the current 
regulatory structure and history, threats and gaps in the infrastructure, and comparative 
review of changes already made by other developed countries and changes proposed by 




secondary analysis is used to reveal the primary overarching sentiment, through 
secondary research data towards the research question, whether there is a consensus on 
the importance of the issue of food safety/defense regulatory reform.  
3. How the Data will be Used 
The secondary qualitative analysis will examine the literature for patterns of 
direction on the issue of growing concerns about food safety from both unintentional and 
intentional threats. The research method chosen will further explore comparative 
examples of similar concerns and the processes of success and failure from actions of 
concept change. These changes came out of crisis and the desire for a more efficient, 
effective, and transparent system. By using secondary qualitative analysis of existing 
information on the thesis topic, it is possible to examine what other countries have done 
to improve their overall food safety structures. Continuing on, the secondary qualitative 
analysis will be used to draw information from the emerging proposals for changes in the 
current food regulatory system, which range from statutory change to proposals for a new 
regulatory system in the United States currently being considered.  
4. End Product 
As a product of the thesis research, I will propose a conceptual model generated 
from the best practices taken from the information researched and my own twenty-nine 
and a half years of experience as a subject matter expert in food safety and defense. The 
author’s experience also includes interactions with the federal and state regulatory 
community, the food and agricultural industry, academic researchers, and citizen groups 
involved in the food and agricultural sector.  
All of the information synthesized creates a conceptual design structure and 
description of a future food and agricultural regulatory oversight agency. The conceptual 
configuration will present a visual and written blueprint for a single food protection 
regulatory system that can stimulate discussion on this important issue. This may add to 
the clarity of the primary research question. The recommendations and conclusion will 
also clarify the position taken away from the thesis as to the importance of change in the 
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food safety and defense regulatory system. For interested researchers who read this thesis 
in the future, the recommended concept framework could lead to a strategy and policy 
recommendation for implementing a new agency. 
G. CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS  
• Chapter II provides an overview of the U.S. food safety regulatory 
structure. It introduces the reader to assumptions made by critics who 
consider it a fragmented system through a glimpse of some of the many 
components of each food regulatory agency.  
• Chapter III explores the challenges and gaps in the food and agricultural 
regulatory structure. 
• Chapter IV looks into threats to the food/agricultural infrastructure and 
discusses the importance of the infrastructure. 
• Chapter V includes a comparison of changes made to the regulatory 
systems of three developed countries. These changes consolidated the 
food/agricultural regulatory structures in each of these countries to a single 
(smaller) and modernized regulatory footprint. 
• Chapter VI examines proposals by others to improve our regulatory 
structure. With the onslaught of food-related illness outbreaks and the 
possibilities of the food infrastructure being used for terrorist gains, the 
reader will receive some insights about the crisis in the infrastructure. 
• Chapter VII includes a discussion of a conceptual framework or model of 
change, borrowing from the best proposals for change and from changes 
already made in the countries reviewed. 
• Chapter VIII is intended to stimulate ideas among those interested in food 
safety/defense. The conceptual model should give decision-makers in the 
U.S., the food and agricultural industry, academic communities interested 
in food safety research, consumer advocacy groups, and consumers 
themselves the insight to collaborate and to create a paradigm shift 
towards a safer food supply for the United States. 
 14
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 15
II. BACKGROUND—THE PRESENT REGULATORY SYSTEM 
The history of government regulation of food safety is one of government 
watchdogs chasing the horse after it's out of the barn. 
   David A. Kessler, M.D. (FDA Commissioner 1990–1997) 
A. COMPLEXITY OF THE CURRENT FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW 
To illustrate the extensive growth of the regulatory structure overseeing the food 
and agricultural sector, a brief history of food safety regulation and an understanding of 
the make-up of each agency (department) are essential. While the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug administration (FDA) under the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) are the primary federal agencies responsible for 
primary protection of the nation’s food supply, many other stakeholders are involved. 
Oversight of food safety in the nation at the federal level has blossomed since the 
creation of the USDA in 1862 and the foundational statues for the current regulatory in 
1906. The food safety regulatory structure in 2008 involves at least 15 agencies or 
departments, of which five are at the executive branch level, four with cabinet status, and 
one independent agency (Robinson, 2005). 
The cabinet level agencies include the USDA, DHHS, Department of Commerce, 
and the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of State is also recognized as 
having a stake in food security from a global perspective. The State Department is 
considered a fifth executive branch with an ancillary role and responsibility included in 
the food and agricultural regulatory structure. In addition, the Environmental Protection 
Agency is an independent agency involved in food and agricultural safety. 
When asked to prepare a report on the food safety regulatory system in 2004, 
Lawrence Dyckman, then Director of Natural Resources and Environment with the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), described in testimony before the U.S. Congress what 
was seen as a complex federal food protection regulatory system. He testified that the 
present federal regulatory system for agricultural and food safety had appeared gradually 
over many years in response to public health concerns and economic emergencies. The 
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years of response to food and agricultural concerns led to the alignment of food safety 
regulatory organizational structures into a cumbersome system of agencies and internal 
departments (Dyckman, 2004).  
Dyckman believes that the responsibilities split between USDA and FDA hinders 
effective congressional oversight and leads to public confusion. “For example, 
congressional oversight committees and GAO must review and analyze multiple 
agencies' programs, policies, and budgets, in order to address questions of overall food 
safety oversight, rather than focus on food safety inspection programs under one agency's 
jurisdiction,” Dyckman said (Food and Drink Weekly, 2004). 
A historical timeline of food safety regulation in the nation and a brief description 
of each agency involved, gives a better picture of the complexity of the system. 
B.  HISTORY OF REGULATORY GROWTH 
When the U.S. population began moving from rural to urban settings and into the 
industrial age, there was growing demand for food products. The first true federal agency 
responsible for food safety was the Department of Agriculture, which was established by 
legislation signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1862. The first U.S. Department of 
Agriculture did not have executive branch or cabinet status. The initial purpose of the 
USDA was to stimulate food production by providing seed for food crop production and 
to provide farmers with information about fair trade (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
2006). In addition, during Lincoln’s administration and within the USDA, the Bureau of 
Chemistry (BAC) was established. The BAC was the forerunner of the present-day Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). With the expansion of the United States toward the west 
following the Civil War, the development of the refrigerated railway car, the growth of 
the livestock industry, international trade, and the meat packing industry, USDA’s role 
was extended to include responsibility for efforts to prevent diseased animals from 
entering the food supply. In 1884, President Chester Arthur signed the Bureau of Animal 
Industry Act, which created USDA’s Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). This was the first 
predecessor of USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) and it marked the 
beginning of regulatory growth. 
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1. Major Changes Ahead (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2007) 
In 1905, Upton Sinclair’s book, The Jungle (1905), exposed unsanitary conditions 
in the Chicago meat packing industry. Public outrage about unsanitary conditions 
prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to establish a commission to investigate the 
allegations. The commission confirmed Sinclair’s allegations. In 1906, President 
Roosevelt signed two new acts into law. These acts were the Meat Inspection Act and the 
Food and Drug Act. The Meat Inspection Act was assigned to USDA’s Bureau of Animal 
Industry (the Bureau later became the Food Safety Inspection Service) to oversee meat 
inspections. In addition, the Food and Drug Act was assigned to USDA’s Bureau of 
Chemistry (later to become the Food and Drug Administration) to oversee the 
misbranding and adulteration of food, drink, and drug products (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2005). 
Fast forward to 1927, and we see the Bureau of Chemistry changing its name to 
the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration, and then, in 1931, changing to the Food 
and Drug Administration. In 1940, the now Food and Drug Administration was moved 
out of the USDA into a new agency, the Federal Security Agency, which in 1953 became 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—the predecessor to the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) that we have today. 
After World War II, with the advent of refrigerated trucks and the federal 
interstate highway system, food processing and meat packing plants began moving to 
rural locations. Modernization and new technologies led to increased production and the 
food processing industry began to flourish. To keep up with the changes, President 
Eisenhower again reorganized the USDA. The 1953 USDA internal transformation was 
to move the Bureau of Animal Industry and the Bureau of Dairy Industry into a research 
type service, the Agricultural Research Service (ARS). In 1957, the poultry industry 
expanded, and another statute was signed into law, the Poultry Products Inspection Act. 
These types of reorganization continued through the next few decades. During these 
decades, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) within USDA was 
created to administer all regulatory functions of the ARS in the 1970s. In addition, the 
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Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) started its modern day transformation during 
the 1970s and early 1980s to develop into the agency it is today (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2007). 
The two original statutes created in 1906 to address food and agriculture safety—
the Meat Inspection Act and the Food and Drug Act—have undergone several 
transformations. As changes are made to statutes, so is the process of continual 
modification in how we regulate food and agriculture. The other agencies with food 
safety responsibilities followed a similar path as their statutory authorities were moved 
from one agency to another over the years. All food and agricultural responsibilities for 
the different agencies had some original connection to the USDA. 
Administration, strategy, and policy changes over time have built a food safety 
regulatory system much larger than the single agency structure formed in 1862. The size 
and complexity of the shift to multiple agencies have morphed through years of food 
safety crisis, statutes, and reorganizations under several presidential administrations.  
C. THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
Responsibility for the safety and defense of the U.S. food supply is distributed 
among multiple agencies that collectively administer more than 30 laws (Shames, 2007). 
These agencies include the USDA with eight departments; the DHHS with three internal 
departments (FDA, CDC, NIH); the EPA and the DOC with one department each; the 
DHS with three internal offices; and the Department of State. Each regulatory entity and 
their component departments or offices are briefly described below. 
1. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
The present composition within the USDA in relation to food safety includes 
eight departments. The USDA is responsible for overseeing the safety of 20 percent of 
the nation’s food supply, both domestic and foreign (Food Safety Central, 2007). 
Following is a list of the individual USDA departments and their responsibilities.  
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a. Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) 
FSIS is the USDA’s public health agency responsible for ensuring that the 
nation’s commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg product is safe and 
wholesome. This includes processed meat products. Figure 1 shows the size of the 




Figure 1.   USDA—FSIS Organizational Chart (From: USDA, 2008, www.fsis.usda.gov/OM/orgcharts/fsis.pdf) 
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b. Animal and Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) 
APHIS provides leadership to ensure protection of the health and value of 
U.S. agricultural resources. APHIS also indirectly protects the nation’s food supply 
through programs to protect plant and animal resources from domestic and foreign pests 
and diseases, such as brucellosis and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (“mad cow” 
disease). 
c. Agricultural Research Service (ARS) 
ARS performs food safety research in support of FSIS’s inspection 
program. 
d. Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 
AMS establishes quality and condition standards for dairy, fruit, 
vegetable, livestock, meat, poultry, and egg products. 
e. Economic Research Service (ERS) 
ERS provides analysis of economic issues affecting the safety of the U.S. 
food supply. 
f. Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA) 
GIPSA establishes quality standards, inspection procedures, and 
marketing of grain and other related products. 
g. National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 
NASS provides statistical data, including agricultural chemical usage data, 
related to the safety of the food supply. 
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h. Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service 
(CSREES) 
CSREES supports food safety research, education, and extension 
programs in the land-grant university system and other partner organizations. 
The USDA is by far the largest of the U.S. agencies responsible for food 
safety at the federal level with the largest budget. The FY 2009 budget request for USDA 
and all of its programs is $95 billion. The budget outlay for FSIS alone for food safety 
will be around $1.1 billion. The food and agricultural defense initiative budget for USDA 
will be $277 million for FY 2009 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2008). The USDA 
inspects 20 percent of the nation’s food supply, but has 80 percent of the food safety and 
food defense budget (Shames, 2007). 
2. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
Three primary agencies within DHHS have roles in food safety—the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH). Following is a list of the individual DHHS agencies that have 
food safety responsibilities. 
a. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
The Food and Drug Administration is (along with USDA) one of the 
primary agencies responsible for the safety of the nation’s food supply. The FDA’s 
programs are responsible for protecting 80 percent of the U.S. food supply; even though 
it’s staff and budget are much smaller than the USDA (Robinson, 2005). The roles of the 
various components within FDA for federal food safety oversight are broken down 
further as follows. 
(1) Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) 
• CFSAN is responsible for all domestic and imported food products except 
for meat, poultry, and processed egg products 
• CFSAN is also responsible for the food defense efforts for FDA in 
conjunction with the Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) and the Office of 
Criminal Investigation (OCI) in FDA 
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• CFSAN operates an oversight compliance program for fishery products. 
This program is listed later as in conjunction with a seafood program 
established in the Department of Commerce 
Figure 2 shows the organizational structure of CFSAN and the 
various programs within the center related to food safety/defense. 
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Figure 2.   Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (From: FDA/CFSAN, 2008, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/orgcharts/CFSANOMS.pdf) 
(2) The Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM). The CVM is 
responsible for assuring that animal drugs and medicated feeds are safe and effective and 
that food from animals is safe to eat. 
Also important to the FDA food safety mission are the Office of 
Regulatory Affairs (ORA) and the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR). 
Within FDA, ORA is the lead office for all field activities of the Food and Drug 
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Administration (FDA, ORA, 2008). ORA is also the conduit for state and federal 
relations in protection of the nation’s food supply. The NCTR’s mission is to conduct 
peer-reviewed scientific research and provide expert technical advice and training that 
enable FDA to make sound science-based regulatory decisions and improve the health of 
the American people (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, NCTR, 2008). 
b. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
Among CDC’s responsibilities are the tasks it performs in foodborne 
related illnesses. The CDC works with federal (FDA, FSIS, NMFS), state, and local food 
safety programs to monitor, identify, and investigate foodborne disease problems to 
determine contributing factors. CDC also works with FDA, FSIS, NMFS, state and local 
public health departments, universities, and industry to develop control methods for a 
food-related illness, and then evaluate the effectiveness of the control methods. In 1995, 
CDC launched “FoodNet,” a collaborative project with the FDA and USDA to improve 
data collection on foodborne illness outbreaks. FoodNet uses active surveillance of 
clinical microbiology laboratories to obtain a more accurate account of positive test 
results for foodborne illness. Along with surveys to analyze ongoing practices, FoodNet 
uses population surveys to identify unreported illness, and research studies to obtain new 
and more precise information about which food items or other exposures may cause 
diseases (Congressional Research Reports for the People, 2008). FoodNet data allows 
CDC to obtain a clearer picture of the incidence and causes of foodborne illness to 
establish baseline data, against which to measure the success of changes in food safety 
programs. The Public Health Service Act provides legislative authority for CDC’s food 
safety activities. CDC’s responsibility for disease surveillance makes the center a major 
stakeholder in food safety/defense issues (U.S. Centers for Disease Control, 2008). 
CDC’s Food Safety Budget for FY 2009 (identified under “All Other Food 
Safety”) is $22,415,000 to support collaborative surveillance systems. The CDC works 
with state and local partners, as well as USDA and FDA, conducts laboratory and 
epidemiologic research, and responds to foodborne disease outbreaks (Centers for 
Disease Control, Office of Budget, 2008). 
 25
The CDC’s responsibility in food safety is one of the components of the 
current system that has shown a need for consistent collaboration. The support that CDC 
programs provide to FDA, USDA, and EPA is a good example of what is possible, 
especially if the efforts were integrated into a single collective food safety agency. 
c. National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
The National Institutes of Health is composed of 27 institutes and centers. 
Several NIH institutes provide research and information on food safety diseases and 
organisms responsible for foodborne illness as part of their mission (National Institute of 
Health, 2008a). During analysis of NIH functions, it was observed that in 1998, NIH’s 
National Library of Medicine, in concert with USDA’s National Agricultural Library and 
the Library of Congress, developed a joint policy on human nutrition. This was seen as a 
positive move to resolve information collection issues related to separate agencies 
involved in related study. The joint policy was an attempt to collect, retain and preserve 
all significant information on human nutrition and food that had been collected by the 
separate parent agencies. However, some aspects of the subject areas are collected and 
treated differently at each organization, depending on its particular mission and the needs 
of its users. This again shows that separate agencies have competing concerns (National 
Institutes of Health, 2008b). 
While all of the organizations described under the DHHS umbrella are 
involved in food safety, the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
(CFSAN) has the greatest budget for the task, however smaller than USDA’s FSIS. The 
total FDA budget for protecting America’s food supply for FY 2009, which amounts to 
80 percent of America’s food supply, will be $661.844 million (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2008). The FDA budget for food safety is less than half the budget of 
USDA, even though FDA carries the bulk of the food safety responsibilities. The budget 
examples provide a glimpse of the convoluted system that has evolved through years of 
reorganization and separation of the food safety agencies and their responsibilities. 
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3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
a. History and Relevance to Food Safety and Food Defense 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began its role in food 
defense and food security as part of the department’s reorganization in 2007. Within the 
DHS structure, the Office of Health Affairs has a mission to protect the health and 
security of U.S. citizens by collaborating and coordinating with other DHS components,2 
federal partners, state partners and the private sector (McGinn, 2007).  
Within the DHS, additional areas in the organizational structure have 
some related roles in food protection. It may appear that DHS has a complex structure in 
its food safety role similar to that of the food safety regulatory structure. However, there 
is a unique difference. The food programs at DHS are under one command structure, 
namely the Secretary of DHS, and its primary mission in food and agriculture is tied to 
coordination of food defense and homeland security. The DHS’s goals are to enhance the 
capabilities of the regulatory structure in coordinating food defense from intentional and 
natural disasters. The agency works closely with agencies that perform the nation’s food 
safety regulatory functions. There are at least four programs at DHS with direct ties to 
food and agriculture (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The following areas 
have ties to the food infrastructure from a homeland security perspective. 
b. The National Protection and Programs Directorate and Its 
Program Areas 
• Office of Infrastructure Protection, under which the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan falls 
c. The Directorate for Science and Technology and its Program 
Areas—Homeland Security Centers of Excellence 
• National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) 
                                                 
2 The National Protection and Programs Directorate and, the Directorate of Science and Technology, 
and the United States Customs and Border Patrol to name three. 
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• National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense 
(FAZD) 
• Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment (CAMRA) 
d. The Office of Health Affairs and its Program Areas—The Office 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and BioDefense 
• Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary (FAV) Defense 
e. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
• Assistance with Import and Export Control of Foods at the border to the 
United States 
In 2003, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program (once 
under the USDA’s Plant Protection and Quarantine program) was transferred to CBP as 
part of their border protection duties under DHS. There was a transfer of 2,700 
employees along with the program at the time. 
4. Food Defense Emphasis 
The main task of the various offices at DHS with food and agricultural functions 
are to assist federal and state food regulatory agencies to prevent, respond, and recover 
from natural disasters, disease outbreaks of national consequence, and agroterrorism 
affecting the nation’s food supply, crops, and livestock (McGinn, 2007). For purposes of 
food defense and safety, in this section, we will focus on the Office of Food, Agriculture, 
and Veterinary Defense and its ties to the food safety regulatory community. 
a. Office of Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense 
Within OHA, the Office of Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense 
(FAV) was established to ensure that food and agriculture receive attention as critical 
infrastructures. The office was created to strengthen public confidence in food protection 
and align with regulatory agencies and other stakeholders in assessing vulnerabilities of 
food/agricultural from a homeland security perspective. Since regulatory responsibilities 
are spread among many agencies, the supposition was that from a national security 
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position, the FAV office would create a bridge between all agencies for food defense. 
The goal is that FAV will foster effectiveness across programs within DHS regarding 
food and agricultural and veterinary defense and between the federal food protection 
programs (McGinn, 2007). 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established to 
coordinate efforts to maintain an increased level of security among domestic agencies. 
One of its primary tasks is to leverage resources within federal, state, and local 
governments and to coordinate multiple agencies and programs into a single integrated 
agency. With the current make-up of the U.S. food safety regulatory system, it would 
appear that food defense efforts to interact and coordinate with multiple agencies in the 
defense of the food supply would be a greater challenge than if DHS had the opportunity 
to deal with a single food safety agency structure.  
5. Department of Commerce (DOC)—Relevance to Food Safety 
a. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)  
The NMFS operates under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). Although the FDA is the primary agency responsible for 
ensuring the safety, wholesomeness, and proper labeling of domestic and imported 
seafood products, NMFS conducts, on a fee-for-service basis, a voluntary seafood 
inspection and grading program that focuses on marketing and quality attributes of U.S. 
fish and shellfish. The NMFS provides fisheries inspection services to assure the safety of 
commercial fisheries products. The primary legislative authority for NMFS’s inspection 
program is the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1621 et seq.). 
As of 2008, NMFS has approximately 160 seafood safety and quality inspectors, and 




b. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
NIST works with other federal agencies such as the FDA and the USDA 
to regulate standards, weights, and measures for food products. Research at NIST 
includes standards and measurement issues related to nutrients in food products, as well 
as contaminants and adulterants in food products. 
The responsibilities of the Department of Commerce in protecting a 
portion of the nation’s food supply add yet another layer to the food safety regulatory 
system. The roles of both NMFS and NIST in their regulatory and research functions also 
cross paths with other agencies with primary food protection roles, such as FDA and 
USDA. The mixed roles of food safety among agencies such as NMFS and FDA can lead 
to confusion when standards differ or when interagency agreements for sharing 
information are not met. 
6. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
a. History and Relevance to Food Safety 
The EPA was created in 1970 as an independent agency to protect the 
environment. The question at first was whether to place control of environmental issues 
under an existing government agency. At first, President Nixon was reluctant to create 
the EPA as an independent agency. The final decision was based on two arguments. The 
first argument was that the primary mission of an existing department, if given control of 
all environmental issues, would bias any decisions it made on a government-wide basis 
with reference to the environment. The second argument was that questions could be 
raised about the objectivity of the same department for similar reasons as a standards-
setting body for other agencies and departments (Lewis, 2007).  
The EPA was woven together from components of various programs at 
other departments. 
• From the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (which is 
now DHHS) components given up were: 
• National Air Pollution Control Administration 
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• Bureaus of Water Hygiene and Solid Waste Management 
• Bureau of Radiological Health  
• From the Food and Drug Administration at HEW 
• Control over tolerance levels for pesticides 
• From the Department of the Interior 
• Functions of the Federal Water Quality Administration and 
• Portions of its pesticide research responsibilities 
• From the Department of Agriculture 
• Gained functions respecting pesticide registration 
• From the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Radiation Council 
• Gained responsibility for radiation criteria and standards. 
7. EPA Programs Involved in Food and Agriculture 
The Office of Pesticide Programs of the EPA is responsible for setting tolerances, 
that is, the limits of the amount of residues from chemicals that can safely be found in or 
on food and for promoting safer methods of pest management. The Office of Water sets 
standards for water, including drinking water, water used in food and agricultural 
applications, and standards on wastewater treatment and release back into the 
environment. Overall, the statutory responsibility for EPA is designed to ensure that 
chemicals used on food crops do not endanger public health and to protect water 
resources from contamination.  
The EPA is another administration that evolved from the collective combination 
of several agency components to construct a more efficient governmental body. The only 
discrepancy from a food safety perspective is the role that the EPA serves to oversee 
pesticide and other chemical tolerances in agriculture, food, and water. There is a specific 
discrepancy in the overlapping jurisdictional area between three agencies regarding 
pesticides and chemical tolerances. While the EPA is the primary agency, its efforts are 
duplicated by the FDA and the USDA, making for inefficient use of resources. The 
inefficiency is not the fault of the agencies themselves, but of the way, these agencies are 
structured. 
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8. Department of State 
a. Food Safety and Food Defense Relevance 
The globalization of the food supply and our country’s growing reliance 
on foreign food products and free trade involves the interaction of both developed and 
non-developed countries (U.S. Department of State, 2008a). The Department of State is 
well suited for the task of involvement in world food security, safety, and defense issues 
that can affect directly and indirectly the U.S. food supply from an international 
perspective. The State Department has an auxiliary but important role in food safety and 
defense through its international diplomacy mission. Within the organizational structure 
of the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, the Bureau of Oceans, 
Environment and Science (OES), and the Office of International Affairs (International 
Health and Biodefense, (IHB)), the Department of State plays an important role in 
protecting U.S. health security and global economic growth through promotion of global 
health. Following is a brief description of some of the U.S. Department of State office 
functions related to food safety under the Office of International Health Affairs (U.S. 
Department of State, 2008b). 
b. Surveillance  
The IHB works with countries and their public health systems to 
strengthen national and international disease surveillance and response systems.  
c. Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security 
The IHB works with countries to control and understand the threats 
associated with the spread of biological agents and other infectious-disease-causing 
agents that could quickly spread across borders. One vector that could be used to spread 
biological agents is the food supply. There have been presentations about food defense by 
Marc L. Ostfield, senior advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security on 
“the importance of diplomacy, international cooperation and collaboration to protect the 
food supply from international contamination” (Ostfield, 2007). Ostfield is particularly 
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interested in defense of the food supply from a bioterrorism perspective and the 
implications of an attack on the global food supply (Marc L. Ostfield, personal 
communication, 2008). 
In an era of intense globalization of the food supply when there is the 
possibility of contamination of food by terrorists, international cooperation through 
diplomacy is essential. The Department of State is well suited for this diplomacy. With 
international trade and the movement of food commodities globally, the State Department 
plays an outlying but important role in food safety/defense, disease, and bioterrorism 
issues. Also, with a plethora of international food producers and processors supplying the 
needs of consumers, the State Department constantly interacts with the U.S. food 
regulatory community and industry.  
9. Other Barriers to Comprehensible Food Safety/Defense 
Harmonization 
a. Involvement of Multiple Congressional Committees 
Several Congressional committees are responsible for considerations of 
food safety/defense legislation, statutes, and issues. Both chambers have several 
committees through which deliberation of food and agricultural legislation may take 
place. Some of the committees involved with food safety are as follows. 
In the Senate, food safety issues are considered by the following 
committees. 
• Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
• Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
• Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
In the House, food safety actions fall under the influence of the following 
committee. 
• Agriculture 
• Energy and Commerce 
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• Oversight and Government Reform 
• Science 
There are also several agriculture subcommittees in both the House and 
Senate. Add to this mix the appropriation committees that serve congressional functions 
on oversight and funding roles on how the major agencies carry out food safety policies 
(Becker & Porter, 2008).  
With so many committees influencing legislation, it is difficult to envision 
a collaborative movement toward a consolidated regulatory system.  
b. Statutes and Agreements Governing Food Safety and Defense 
At least 30 laws or statutes govern food safety oversight among U.S. food 
regulatory agencies. In addition, more than 71 interagency agreements govern the 
combined food safety oversight responsibilities (Robinson, 2005).  
Federal officials argue that by working cooperatively and through formal 
understandings among the agencies, federal agencies now, for the most part, avoid 
duplicating efforts. However, the overlapping agreements are complicated and not always 
followed because of conflicting oversight and unproductive coordination between the 
agencies (Shames, 2008). The federal system is further complemented by the 50 states 
and the U.S. territories, all of which have their own regulations and agencies for 
regulating and inspecting the safety and quality of food products.  
c. State and Local Agencies 
State-level agencies are the backbone of the country’s food protection 
efforts that monitor and inspect food commodities at the intrastate wholesale and retail 
level. State and local agencies regulate the safety of the food, agriculture, and water 
supply; investigate and monitor food-related disease outbreaks and the response from 
their respective jurisdictions. In almost every instance, these food protection regulatory 
systems mimic their counterparts at the federal level. Oversight of regulations of any 
sector in the food supply chain also relies on whether the food industry component 
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participates in interstate or intrastate commerce or sells wholesale or retail. Thus, even at 
the state and local level, the statutory structure governing food safety yields a regulatory 
system that makes jurisdiction over food dependent on the type of food, the way the food 
is processed, or the type of adulterants found in a particular food. This additional 
regulatory layer duplicates the federal system and further dilutes the efficiency of food 
safety/defense oversight. 
d. Industry and Academia 
The importance of both the food industry’s and academic research 
institutions cannot be understated. The insights that these entities provide in analyzing 
foodborne pathogens have provided valuable information for the safe handling of food 
products to feed people all over the world. However, many of these organizations must 
also deal with the multiple layers of regulatory agencies, especially as new statutes are 
implemented or specific research is ordered. 
Additionally, there is sometimes competition among these organizations 
for federal research money when illness events occur or emerging pathogens are 
discovered. Since 9/11, there has even been an increase in research for food defense 
purposes, not only from a biological and chemical contamination perspective, but also 
from a technological and physical protection angle. This has led to more federal dollars 
being spent and provided through grants and research funding, not only from a single 
regulatory agency to these research entities, but from several. This adds confusion to 
what research is being duplicated and how the information resulting from the research is 
shared. 
D. CONCLUSION 
One could argue that divided or not, the separations of responsibilities among the 
federal food safety regulating agencies keeps a focus on specific items in the food supply 
chain, yielding a keener awareness and protection of the food supply. However, in recent 
years, incidents of food-related illnesses and food commodity contamination have 
brought the validity of this argument into question. The primary food safety programs in 
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the United States were created and formed out of the Department of Agriculture more 
than 100 years ago.3 Years of differing statutes, obligations, and responsibility shifts have 
led to the regulatory framework of food and agricultural safety programs that we see 
today. Distribution of food safety regulatory responsibilities for specific commodities 
based on years of differing, but similar, legal statutes are what the current regulatory 
structure is built on. 
Paths often cross among regulatory agencies with food safety responsibilities, and 
duplication of efforts is common. Historically, this duplication has not necessarily been 
counter-productive to food safety, and sometimes lent an extra level of protection. A 
science-based approach has always been used to identify biological and chemical 
contaminates that relate to food safety and/or response models have been applied 
accordingly (Haines, 2004, Chapter 3, pp. 81–83). The system components in federal 
food and agricultural regulatory agency mission statements have always mentioned a 
focus on preventive methods to keep contaminants from entering the food supply. The 
introduction of contaminants into the food supply has generally been seen as accidental.  
Critics charge that duplications of effort waste taxpayers’ money and result in a 
fragmented system that prevents effective focus of resources on areas where the risks of 
contamination are greatest. The complexity of the regulatory system can have a dramatic 
affect on the protection of the food infrastructure. In general, there has been limited 
collaboration or passing of the problem and investigation to another agency at a different 
stage in the event if warranted.  
Regulatory agencies at any level (federal, state, and local) of the food and 
agricultural sector continuum rely on the cooperation and knowledge of the food industry 
component in the food supply chain, as well as on academic and research institutions. It 
is difficult to administer food safety protection regulation without the efforts of the 
industry and without the science garnered from research about food-related pathogens 
and methods to reduce them. However, the large number of entities and statutes involved 
tends to complicate and further divide improvements in food protection. 
                                                 
3 USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
that was once the Bureau of Chemistry within the USDA. FDA primary food inspection and regulatory 
department within the FDA is the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN). 
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Thus, why are there so many regulatory agencies involved in food safety and 
protection? What are some of the challenges and gaps created by the regulatory structure? 
We will explore these questions in Chapter III. 
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III. CHALLENGES AND GAPS IN TODAY’S HOMELAND 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE U.S. FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL REGULATORY SYSTEM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
With an expanding global food market and the potential of intentional threats to 
the food supply, more focus has been placed on how we regulate agriculture and food in 
the United States. Questions of confidence in our system and its ability to protect the food 
supply have surfaced among consumer protection groups (DeWaal, 2007).  
B. UNINTENDED GAPS AND CHALLENGES 
The formation of several food and agricultural regulatory agencies over the years 
since creation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1862, while intended to improve 
food and agricultural safety and security, has evolved into a system with unintended gaps. 
The large number of agencies that have been created to improve food protection may 
have inadvertently increased gaps about who covers what, and who will be in charge of 
what aspect of food protection, as new statutes are added. While regulatory agencies 
work to keep the nation’s food supply safe, they cannot do it alone. All federal and state 
agencies have missions focused on protection of the food infrastructure. However, 
differing statutes, laws, and directives initiated in the 1800s form the foundation for the 
nation’s food safety system and have kept these agencies on alternate paths in how they 
manage food protection (Center for Science in the Public Interest, 2005). The following 
categories are a glimpse into some of the challenges of the system. 
1. Duplication of Food Safety/Defense/Security Roles 
There are now 15 federal agencies that collectively, but separately, administer at 
least 30 different statutes on food safety (Shames, 2008). Over the years, we have seen an 
increased separation of food safety divided by commodity, food components, or 
ingredients, and crisis that has increased or changed statutes to define the food safety 
actions that are now necessary. There has been a history of response to crisis rather than 
 38
proactive preparation. While reactions to food safety crisis often have brought about new 
laws intended to avert new crisis, they also have caused a weakening of agency structures 
as resources are stretched. Some agencies cannot meet all of their statutory obligations 
(Shames, 2008). While different statutes and agencies are responsible for different 
commodities, the nature of food/agricultural products has led to a crossing of agency 
statutory assignments in the same facilities, creating duplication. Statutes written for the 
different food regulatory agencies sometimes prevent one agency from assisting another 
when each statue is taken to the letter of the law. 
a. Food Product Safety Duplication 
One example used often in the literature is the pizza plant scenario. In 
pizza production plants, there are at least two inspecting agency representatives, one from 
the USDA and one from the FDA. If the pizza is topped with more than 2 percent meat 
product, then the USDA inspects the product. If it is less than 2 percent meat product or a 
cheese-topped pizza, the FDA will inspect it. Figure 3 illustrates the number of agencies 
that represent the farm-to-retail path of a processed pizza product. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Federal Agency Responsibility for Pizza Production (From: Dyckman, 
1999) 
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The same situation applies to open-face sandwiches with meat as opposed 
to closed-face sandwiches with meat. Open-face means the FDA inspects the product, 
and closed-face means the USDA inspects it. Figure 4 illustrates this example of multiple 
federal agency involvement and duplication of efforts in a processing plant. The 
inconsistencies attributed to statutory oversight gave rise to a GAO report that generated 
this excellent example of duplication of effort, but separation of responsibilities. Gaps 
can occur in the inspection process when it is assumed that one agency and not the other 
handle specific processes. In both examples, funding and statute differences cause 
discrepancies in inspection frequencies. USDA has a mandatory charge to be in the 
production (processing) plant and to make daily inspections. FDA does not have a 
mandatory charge for inspection and because of a lack of funding and staff, it may be in a 
plant only once every two to five years. With differing statutes, however, one agency 
cannot cross lines to assist the other with inspection of products under their charge. An 
example of where this leads in economic terms is the current crisis in the automotive 
industry, where the union can dictate who can work on what part of an automobile 
assembly line or component product. In critical economic times, when food safety 
regulatory agencies are not able to inspect or regulate a product in the same facility, it 
leads to ineffective use of resources and weakening of the regulatory process. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Federal Agency Duplication on Inspection of an Open- and Closed-Faced 
Sandwich Product (From: Robinson, 2001)  
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b. Food Defense Duplication 
There is also duplication of offices within each agency. A search of the 
words “food defense” at each of the primary and ancillary agency Web sites that have 
food and agricultural responsibility turns up results showing that each agency has a food 
defense or security office (usda.gov, fda.gov, epa.gov, nmfs.noaa.gov). When we 
consider that each agency’s office handles not only food safety, but also criminal 
investigations of intentional adulteration or abuse of food commodities, then the picture, 
metaphorically speaking, is larger than life. Within the text of new laws such as the 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002, the concept of collective actions of regulatory agencies to carry 
out the work of food safety/defense is presented (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
2008a). As more responsibilities are added to the work of each agency, there is actually 
more separation of agencies by statutes and duplication of food defense activities. The 
new laws under which the agencies operate do not take into account the consistent 
problem of original statutes that still impede what agencies can or cannot do together. 
With globalization, complexity continues to grow. 
2. Globalization—Challenges with Tracing Back 
The potential for attacks using food products has now gone global. There are now 
more opportunities along the food supply chain for food products to be deliberately 
contaminated. An anomaly that may appear to be a contradiction to this increase is the 
increase in distribution from fewer food-processing venues. Modernization and free trade 
have led to consolidation of more and more food processing activities by fewer facilities. 
This means that a larger volume of food products could be contaminated at a single point 
and its distribution could have global implications.  
Analysis, at first, might suggest that fewer processing facilities would improve 
our ability to prevent terrorist attacks on the food supply. However, the ability to trace 
back origins of product from different sources that funnel into processing and distribution 
facilities seems to be still missing. The recent tomato and jalapeño pepper-related 
Salmonella outbreak shows the problems associated with a non-uniform standard for 
trace-back of food commodities and the problems that can arise from commingling 
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commodities from different sources. The global demand for seasonal fresh fruit and 
vegetable products throughout the year is a factor here. A product deliberately 
contaminated in an approved foreign country that has mutual trade acceptance of food 
commodities with other countries can make its way around the world within 24 hours. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of travel, which can apply fairly well to the actual growth of 
the global food supply chain, in terms of both access to food commodities in time and the 
growth of the population that demands on-time delivery of food products and non-
seasonal choices of food products. The following statement describes the effect that 
globalization of food production has on food safety. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Speed of Global Travel in Relation to World Population Growth (From: 
Murphy and Nathanson, 1994) 
We eat out from the world's gardens, but not all are well-kept. Raspberries 
from Guatemala made thousands of Americans ill from a parasite called 
Cyclospora, which was in the water used to spray and irrigate the 
raspberries. Potential disease-carrying insects and contaminated foods, 
plants, and other products cross U.S. borders every day. Since the 1980s, 
food imports to the U.S. have doubled. Increases in food imports strain the 
nation's food safety system. While we rely on the FDA, USDA and other 
government agencies to protect our food supply, inspections have dropped 
to half of what they were five years ago. As the world's nations become 
more intertwined, interdependent and intensely competitive, will the rest  
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of the world's standards become more like those of the U.S. or will the 
U.S., despite high standards, become more vulnerable to the rest of the 
world's microbes? (Health Media Lab, 2004) 
3. Intelligence—Important to National Security of the Food and 
Agricultural Infrastructure  
Intelligence efforts, along with science and education, are basic components of a 
successful food defense/food safety effort. In an interview with a high-ranking 
bioterrorism expert in the U.S. federal government, the issue of whether there was 
pertinent information on the intent of terrorists to use biological, chemical, or radiological 
agents against the food and agricultural infrastructure was discussed (Marc L. Ostfield, 
PhD, Senior Advisor, Department of State, personal communication, July 2008). Dr. 
Ostfield is very familiar with the destructive potential of biological agents as weapons of 
mass destruction. As part of a discussion of bioterrorism and the class agents identified 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the topic of threat intelligence came 
up. There was an understanding during this discussion that classified information is not 
available for discussion unless it is first properly vetted and scrubbed for open source 
distribution on the issue of food and agricultural threats from terrorist organizations. 
Open source information in the form of evidence showing the intentions of international 
terrorists to target agriculture, food, and water is available. Documents were found in 
2002 in caves during a military operation called Operation Anaconda (Williams, 2005). 
The evidence referred to the use of food, water, and other vectors to deliver biological 
agents targeting people, culture, and the economy. Dr. Ostfield agreed that the open 
source evidence identified by the author was probably “as good as it gets” when 
identifying the desire of terrorist organizations to use biological and chemical elements as 
a weapon of terror using food, agriculture and water as a vector. While direct evidence 
may be limited, the evidence discovered so far does show that there is a need to remain 
vigilant and proactive in the defense of the food infrastructure. Information about threats 
from intelligence gathering is equally important to the food sector. With regulatory 
separation among the various agencies, the potential for gaps in sharing of pertinent 
information on threats to the sector may be lost or at least delayed. 
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As with many infrastructures in the 21st century, the use of technology to run 
production processes is a mainstay. However, the use of technology, especially cyber-
technology, to disrupt processes is an area of terrorism concern not often discussed as a 
threat; not only from known terrorist groups, but from rogue nation states that may seek 
to disrupt the U.S. economy. These groups may employ cyber-crime on the U.S. food 
industry to induce disfavor of a nation’s or industry’s commodity (J. Bumgarner, personal 
communication, July 2008). Computer systems used for automated food processing that 
control temperatures critical to keeping potentially hazardous foods out of the danger 
zone of bacterial growth4 could be used to disrupt control of these functions. 
For example, controls that indicate proper function of equipment can be disrupted 
to falsify temperature readings that are critical for safe food products. Laboratory test 
results of dairy products for antibiotics controlled by computers and computer programs 
can be disrupted to alter test results. Bumgarner explained that dairy milk laboratory test 
results could be altered to indicate a need to retest a product or to show that a product is 
contaminated, when in fact correct test results would show the product to be safe. Critical 
information sharing that indicates such cyber-activity is a challenge with the various 
agencies, even in the areas when duplication of service occurs (J. Bumgarner, personal 
communication, July 2008). Gaps are created in the area of intelligence and information 
sharing when each food regulatory agency follows a separate path based on statutes and 
differing philosophies for prevention and response. 
4. Homeland Security Presidential Directives and National Security of 
the Food and Agricultural Infrastructure  
The food sector and the importance of its protection as a critical infrastructure 
from a national security perspective have become more evident in recent years. 
Following September 11, 2001, at least five Homeland Security Presidential Directives 
(HSPD), have mentioned the food and agricultural infrastructure directly or indirectly. 
HSPD’s 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 all mention the food/agricultural infrastructure, with HSPD–9 
                                                 
4 The danger zone of bacterial growth is defined in South Carolina as the temperatures between 130º F. 
and 45º F. Under ideal conditions of moisture, food source, and a time- temperature relationship 
microorganisms known to be food pathogens will grow exponentially in this “danger zone.” 
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being very sector-specific to food and agriculture. By virtue of now being a recognized 
critical infrastructure, the food regulatory system agencies are directly involved in 
fulfilling their requirements to national security. Each of the five presidential directives 
follows a path that illustrates the gaps and challenges of agencies responsible for food 
safety and defense by adding layers of complexity (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008). 
a. HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents 
HSPD-5 enhances the ability of the United States to manage domestic 
incidents by establishing, a single comprehensive national incident management system.  
b. HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
and Protection 
HSPD-7 establishes a national policy for federal departments and agencies 
to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and key resources in the United States and 
to protect them from terrorist attacks.  
c. HSPD-8: National Preparedness and Its National Planning 
Annex 
HSPD-8 identifies steps for improved coordination in response to 
incidents. This directive describes how federal departments and agencies will prepare for 
such a response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism 
incident.  
d. HSPD-9: Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food 
HSPD-9 establishes a national policy to defend the food/agriculture 
system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.  
e. HSPD-10: Biodefense for the 21st Century 
HSPD-10 provides a comprehensive framework for our nation's 
biodefense. 
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A search on issues of food safety and defense related to national security 
at each agency Web site that has any connection to the food infrastructure showed the 
added layer of structure each agency has formalized since establishment of each 
directive. Spread across several agencies with similar missions, the duplication of efforts 
adds to a continued flow of complexity and widening of the gap in regulatory missions. 
In today’s world with a myriad of agencies that have responsibilities in the 
infrastructure, how do you communicate to the industry and the public the importance of 
food safety and food defense? Therein lays one of the problems involved in 
communicating the need for infrastructure protection when the regulatory system that is 
charged with protecting the infrastructure is spread among so many federal, state, and 
local agencies. For example, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) addresses 
and identifies 17 critical infrastructures in the United States (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006). Within NIPP, sector-specific plans are identified. Further 
delineated are the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sectors and plans 
identifying sector-specific agencies (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Both 
the USDA and the FDA are described as key agencies responsible for planning the 
defense and protection of the food/agricultural infrastructure. 
The NIPP sector-specific plan (SSP) identifies the USDA and DHHS/FDA 
as the federal agencies responsible for the defense of the food/agricultural infrastructure 
and clearly shows the separation of the food safety regulatory system in the United 
States. The 2007 report cover of the food and agricultural SSP identifies the differences 
in one sentence. The cover title includes an asterisk (*) that refer to this footnote: 
“Contains both the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services/Food and Drug Administration portions of the plan” (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007). The efforts for this one critical infrastructure’s 
protection, while primarily shared between USDA and FDA, are also shared to even 
more specific component pieces of food commodities. To varying degrees of 
responsibility, other agencies, including the EPA, DOC, and now DHS, have roles in the 
oversight of food and agricultural products as shown in Chapter II.  
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5. Education 
One of the best ways to prepare for and prevent problems is through education. 
Each federal agency has a responsibility to educate their regulatory partners at the state 
level, regulated stakeholders, and consumers on the issues of food safety and defense. 
One of the best ways to prevent foodborne illnesses is to increase awareness. However, 
on all levels, there have been reductions of expenditures and budgeting for education and 
training, not only for the industry and consumers, but also for the regulators themselves. 
With an increase in food production facilities from the farm to the retail level and limited 
growth in the number of inspectors, the effort devoted to education has been reduced.5 
With differing levels of funding, resources, and personnel, not all agencies can dedicate a 
significant amount of their budget to education and training, which in turn affects the 
food/agricultural sector. One missing link of knowledge about food safety can make the 
difference between an illness occurring or not. Also, when education is provided, there is 
sometimes a conflict about what each agency’s statutes may require for any specific food 
protection procedure. For example, USDA may require raw poultry products to be 
cooked to an internal temperature of 170 degrees F., while FDA may require the same 
poultry product to be cooked to 165 degrees F. On cold holding of potentially hazardous 
foods (PHF), the federal agencies may say to “hold PHFs at 41 degrees F. or below,” 
while some state agencies may require cold holding at 45 degrees F. or below. 
A collective effort by regulatory agencies, the industry, and consumer groups to 
agree on food safety/defense educational awareness goals and definitions would help 
eliminate conflicting requirements.  
6. Industry Buy-In 
Like most other national infrastructures, the bulk of the food/agricultural 
infrastructure is privately owned. Any time a component of industry is required by statute 
                                                 
5 This has been first-hand experience in my state. Our program has over the last few years, by choice 
of management, reduced the amount of education given to regulators, industry, and consumers. A process 
that is slowly being reversed, it remains without adequate funding. An increased ability to pursue 
proactively educational and training efforts, understanding of food safety and food defense for the public 
cannot be enhanced locally, regionally, or nationally without proactive planning and funding. 
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to comply with a requirement of a regulatory agency, from the industry’s perspective, it 
costs time and money. Complying with regulations is a cost of doing business for the 
industry, and it is in the best interest of consumers, the industry, and the regulatory 
agencies. Regulation of the food infrastructure was born out of concern for the safety of 
consumers. Most people who work in the food industry understand this, knowing that the 
public expects safe, wholesome, unadulterated food. Industry components that do not 
follow safe food handling practices do not last long, especially since the media is sure to 
broadcast information about illnesses caused by lack of care. Industries need to buy-in to 
the concept of food defense and how that differs from food safety. 
If an industry is regulated by several agencies, new requirements from the 
multiple agencies who are involved will only create confusion as to the differences 
between what they are already required to do. This also makes the job of the regulatory 
employees who perform inspections more difficult. Whatever the complexities, however, 
it all comes down to consumer protection and the vitality of the nation’s food system. 
Consistency of regulatory messages, are important factors for consolidating an industry’s 
buy-in to any new challenges or threats. Beyond industry buy-in, however, is the 
consistency that such a message will bring to the regulatory community as it addresses 
consumer concerns and confidence.  
C. CONSUMER CONFIDENCE CHALLENGES—MULTIPLE EFFECTS 
The CDC estimates that foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 million 
illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in the United States each year. 
Known pathogens account for an estimated 14 million illnesses, 60,000 hospitalizations, 
and 1,800 deaths; while, unknown agents account for the remaining 62 million illnesses, 
265,000 hospitalizations, and 3,200 deaths (Mead et al., 1999). These figures are for 
unintentional illnesses and does not account for the new concern of intentional 
contamination, yet no new estimates have been considered since the late 1990s. Also, 
although these estimates are for the United States alone, they are often quoted in World 
Health Organization (WHO) documents produced by its United Nations Food Safety 
Office when addressing world food safety issues. According to the WHO, foodborne 
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diseases affect up to approximately 30 percent of the population in industrialized 
countries each year. The international agency reports that an estimated 1.5 million people 
die annually from diarrheal diseases linked to contaminated food or water. Again, these 
numbers refer to unintentional contamination. A new category and focus in food 
protection has been added to the regulatory vocabulary to address the post 9/11 mentality 
and protection of the food supply from intentional contamination. 
With globalization of the food supply, the possibilities of an intentional 
contamination of the world’s food supply to cause fear and chaos and affect stability of 
economies of the world are increasingly plausible (Williams, 2005). The mad cow crisis 
that affected the United Kingdom and Germany could easily have been an intentional 
contamination. The crisis led to a distrust of the food safety regulatory systems in both 
countries and a fear of eating beef. However, even beyond the possibility of intentional 
contamination of beef in these European countries, an extended consequence of the fear 
factor about what one should or should not eat could cause an economical crisis. As 
stated in the Psychology of Terrorism (Bonger et al., 2007, p. 123), “the consequences of 
socially amplified fears are not simply psychological.” The mad cow crisis cost the 
European Union $2.8 billion and more than 4 billion pounds in the United Kingdom 
(Powell, 2001). A deliberate attack on the food supply could have a similar economic 
impact in the United States where one in every eight people is employed in a food-related 
occupation (Bonger et al., 2007).  
The psychological effects on consumer behavior because of fear and frustration 
over the possibility of a contaminated food product (loss of consumer confidence) would 
have a “ripple effect” on other aspects of the economy.  
1. Terrorists and Terrorism—Added Psychological Issues  
Some consumers are concerned that the recent food contaminations and food-
related illnesses may have been deliberately caused. While no direct evidence supports 
this concern, this apprehension has a multiplier effect and influences attitudes on the 
premise that the food infrastructure makes a soft target for terrorist activity. While attacks 
on this infrastructure would not provide the “big bang” of some violent types of terrorist 
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attacks, food-illness outbreaks show the potential damage that such an attack could cause. 
Damage to the economy, fear among the public, and distrust in the government and 
potential destabilization of the U.S. government are the goals of some terrorists.  
Recent outbreaks of foodborne illnesses show the difficulty that investigators face 
when tracing back to the source of the outbreak. The recent Salmonella Saintpaul 
outbreak first linked to tomatoes and then to jalapeño peppers, shows the potential of 
contamination of the food supply as a weapon of terror. The investigation to identify the 
source of the contamination was in full swing for more than three months, but 
investigators had no definitive answers as to where the source of the contamination was 
located. Eventually, there were questions about whether tomatoes were the actual vector 
for the Salmonella bacteria or whether the vector was jalapeño peppers in fresh salsa 
products. This shows how easily terrorists could contaminate food at several locations. 
The anxiety of not knowing whether your food will make you ill leads to distrust of the 
food industry and the government regulating food safety. 
CDC reports that for every one person who is a stool-culture-positive victim of 
Salmonella in the United States there is a multiplier of 38.6 who are ill, who remain 
uncounted (Voetsch et al., 2004). The Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak had more than 
1,000 confirmed cases. So, using this as an example, when we calculate with the CDC 
method the number of people who did not report illness for various reasons (fear of 
doctors, affordability, no medical insurance, etc.), we can estimate that another 38,000 
people likely became ill from the same source but were undiagnosed and not counted.  
2. Stress and Coping 
The longer an investigation continues without identification of the source of the 
contamination or the foods involved, the more anxiety, fear, stress and distrust develops 
between the food grower, the food processor, the government, and the consumer—
especially those who have become ill. It was difficult for those involved, both the ill and 
the several sectors affected by the outbreak, to cope with the size of the Salmonella 
outbreak. The frustration of not being able to identify the source of the outbreak leads to 
increased stress and an inability to alleviate the fears of consumers and others involved. 
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The difficulty of the process lies in the fact that in the tomato and Jalapeño pepper 
case(s), for example, the investigation went on for so long (more than three months) with 
no definitive results. Consumers surveyed by Deloitte LLC (2008) expressed distrust in 
the government and resentment of the food industry. The respondents also expressed 
stress and fear about the government and its inability to resolve this issue. 
3. Consequences 
The tomato-Jalapeño foodborne illness related outbreak ultimately involved more 
than 1,000 people with confirmed cases of Salmonellosis in 40 states and cost about $100 
million. In addition, there were indications that the public was losing faith in the 
regulatory system (CBS Evening News, 2008).  
Another case that demonstrates why food infrastructure vulnerabilities need to be 
reexamined is the case that involved South Korean demonstrations against imported beef 
from the United States. In this incident, it was believed that a “downer” cow suspected of 
having Mad Cow Disease might have made it through the slaughter process. The incident 
led to the recall and destruction of several thousand pounds of U.S. beef in 2003. In July 
2008, more than five years after the recall, South Koreans demonstrated against the South 
Korean government’s trade agreement with the United States to begin importing beef 
again to South Korea. There is still fear after five years by many South Koreans that U.S. 
beef is contaminated, when in fact there is no evidence of contamination.  
Two years after the spinach E. coli-related outbreak, many people are still 
apprehensive about eating spinach. Peter Pan peanut butter was contaminated during 
processing with Salmonella several years ago, and some people still will not eat peanut 
butter. Some people called health agencies two years after the event and asked whether 
they would get sick from eating a specific peanut butter. One caller was asked if she had 
eaten the peanut butter, what the lot number was of the peanut butter, what her symptoms 





these questions was “no.” The caller then explained that she had not even opened the jar 
of peanut butter. She was distressed because she thought that she would get ill from 
eating it, and was feeling ill from just the thought of it (firsthand account).6 
4. The Media 
The buildup of false information from the media, the government, and the 
industry can worsen even a small incident, causing panic, fear, and distrust in what is 
being done to eliminate the crisis. False, inaccurate, or withheld information, on any 
scale, whether national, state or local, can lead to roadblocks in the investigation and 
confusion among the public. While too much knowledge may sometimes have a 
boomerang affect and increase angst, information presented in a straightforward manner 
is critically important to lower anxiety among the public (Laliberte, 2008). 
5. Conclusion and Best Practices 
The national security implications of an attack on the food infrastructure could be 
devastating from both an economical and psychological standpoint.  
What is needed is better risk communication to all parties involved in the 
investigation and the reporting of the investigation. Simple and straightforward principles 
in the practice of risk mitigation are important tools to identify the source of the illness 
and lessen the psychological effects of illness outbreaks. Accurate information builds 
trust and confidence. Communication and management of risks to those involved in an 
illness outbreak and those affected by the outbreak can be powerful tools in limiting or 
reducing negative reactions. It is important in risk communication and risk management 
to stay on top of the situation at hand. This gives some assurance that the information will 
be accurately relayed (Cross & Parker, 2004, p. 100). 
If the public is aware of the consequences of contamination to the food 
infrastructure, they can better understanding how they can play a role in preventing, 
anticipating, reducing, and even eliminating potential terrorist threats by becoming a 
                                                 
6 First hand account by the author during the recall of Peter Pan peanut butter. 
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better informed and vigilant population. By increasing awareness of the causes of 
foodborne illnesses, the steps being taken to prevent further illnesses, the management of 
fear may be enhanced, at least in understanding the threats to the food infrastructure. Risk 
communication and risk management are principles discussed but rarely implemented by 
regulatory agencies in times of crisis. Risk mitigation strategies are among the gaps and 
challenges faced by food and agricultural agencies. Shortfalls in risk communication and 
management strategies are products associated with the gaps and limited educational 
resources provided by regulatory agencies to their workforce. Most of these shortfalls in 
risk education, as this author sees it, are a by-product of a complex regulatory system that 
leaves some agencies under budgeted and incapable of providing the necessary skills 
needed to deal with the aforementioned challenges. 
D. SUMMARY 
The present system is highly complex and has shown inconsistency in how it has 
handles instances of unintentional contamination. The importance of the food and 
agricultural sector to national security cannot be overemphasized since the industry is 
critical for sustaining life. Changes in the regulatory system have often been discussed 
over the years for many reasons. Can we afford not to explore a more consolidated food 
safety regulatory system with the added concern of terrorism against the food supply? 
This question warrants a look in Chapter IV at the importance of the food and 
agricultural infrastructure and the threats that challenge its security. 
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IV. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IMPORTANCE AND THREATS 
TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
Osama bin Laden urged his followers to “hit hard the American economy 
at its heart and core.” Nothing is more at the heart and core of our 
economy than our agriculture and food industry. It is a $1 trillion 
economic sector that creates one-sixth of our gross national product. 
(Senator Susan Collins, 2003, Quote to the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Psychological terror, destabilization, and devastation to governments and citizens 
are some of the primary goals of terrorist organizations. Terrorists, both domestic and 
foreign, lone wolf or group, have used many methods and devices to attain their goals. 
The food supply provides a vector that is vital to the economy and sustainability of a 
nation and a vast sector that can be easily attacked without major expense. 
With the ease of acquiring biological and chemical agents, in particular, those 
zoonotic biological agents known to cause food-related illnesses, the food supply is a 
major infrastructure that requires constant and vigilant protection. At threat are the health 
of humans, animals, plants, water, and the economy of a nation. Plants and animals, like 
humans, are susceptible to disease or cellular destruction caused by microorganisms, 
chemical toxins, and even radiological materials. Terrorists who are intent on destruction 
to humans, plants, animals, and the economy, will eventually see, if they have not 
already, the food sector as the new front in asymmetrical warfare. The importance of 
international and domestic trade to our domestic economy is why the food sector makes 
for an almost perfect target for the use of biological and chemical contaminants or other 
means by those individuals or groups intent on attacking the United States.  
B. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE—IMPORTANT TO A NATION’S 
SURVIVAL 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2002 and its revision in 2007 
focused on identifying the nation’s critical infrastructures. The food and agricultural 
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infrastructure were identified as critical infrastructure sectors (White House, 2002, 
Revision 2007). The basic importance of food to sustaining life gives the sector 
importance among the critical infrastructures. The interdependence of the food and 
agricultural sector to other infrastructures also has importance from an economical 
perspective. Depressed or destroyed food resources would impact many areas. Without 
nutrition from food, the workforce in other infrastructures could be disrupted, causing a 
cascading affect over time. 
Figure 6 illustrates the overlap of the U.S. food infrastructure with other critical 
infrastructures. Ted Lewis (2003) illustrated this interaction in his Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Hierarchy diagram. The diagram, though showing a hierarchy, is not 
necessarily hierarchical in the truest sense (Lewis, 2003). However, it does show the 
dependency of each sector on the others. Every component shown has a link to the food 
sector. Critical damage to this key sector could trickle down to all other sectors and vice 
versa. While Lewis’ illustration considers level 1 sectors as the primary sectors, which if 
destroyed or damaged could affect level 2 and level 3 sectors, food and agriculture are 
needed, along with water, for sustaining life. 
 
 
Figure 6.   CIP Hierarchy (From: Lewis, 2003) 
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History shows that food and water have been used as tools to win wars and 
conflicts. By controlling these elements or destroying them, countries have prevented 
opposing forces from keeping their soldiers and citizens nourished. Their will to fight and 
their willingness to submit can be affected (Saltveit, 2008, American Historical 
Association, n.d.). A quote attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte on the importance of food 
in war was “An army marches on its stomach” (FamousQuotes.com, n.d.). Food is 
important to survival, and threats against the food supply lead to fear, panic, distrust, and 
destabilization of economies and eventually governmental control, as described in 
Chapter III. So what are some of the threats to food and agriculture? 
C. THREATS TO THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY 
The food supply in the United States appears so far not to have been exploited by 
terrorist groups. However, when food-related illnesses occur, it may be hard to 
distinguish an intentional attack from an unintentional attack. As with 9/11, no one would 
have expected airplanes to be used so effectively in way that caused so much destruction 
in lives and property and economic destabilization so quickly.  
1. Terrorism Against the Food and Agricultural Sector 
The global and domestic food commodity markets are so intertwined with the 
economies of other nations that the impact of terrorist attacks on them could be 
enormous. Acts of terrorism could be used to slow down the movement of food products 
that are perishable to the point of ruin. Terrorism against food products can be an 
effective tool affecting trade on both the international and the domestic front. 
D. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE A SOFT TARGET: THE NEXT 
TERRORISM NEXUS? 
Intentional contamination, destruction, or disruption in the food infrastructure is 
most likely to occur by insertion of biological, chemical, or radioactive materials into the 
food, agricultural, and water supply. The use of biological and chemical elements as 
weapons of terror and violence had been frequently mentioned before September 11, 
2001 in research and writings. Stories of unconventional weapons related to food and 
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agricultural vectors range from studies of war in societies of the past to fictional 
literature, novels, and plays. Since September 11, documents about the vulnerability of 
the food/agriculture infrastructures have multiplied. A list of documents at the Center for 
Infectious Disease Research and Policy (2008) provide some selected reading showing 
research being done on food vulnerability. Three years after 9/11, Health and Human 
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson said he worries constantly about food poisoning. 
I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not, you 
know, attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do. … We are 
importing a lot of food from the Middle East, and it would be easy to 
tamper with that. (Branigin, Allen, & Mintz, 2004) 
RAND Corporation analysts have testified before Congress about the impact of a 
major disaster of the food and agricultural sectors. Especially significant was an excerpt 
from testimony in 2001 by Peter Chalk:  
The impact of a major agricultural/food-related disaster in the U.S. would 
be enormous and could easily extend beyond the immediate agricultural 
community to affect other segments of society. It is possible to envision at 
least three major effects that might result—mass economic destabilization, 
loss of political support and confidence in government, and social 
instability. (Chalk, 2001) 
Whether intentional or not, contamination or destruction of food and agricultural 
products anywhere along the food supply chain, have been considered potential target 
vectors for terrorists, domestic and foreign. “An enemy bent on victory at any cost could 
and will make the food supply of a populace a main target” (ShoahEducation.com, 2003). 
Biological, chemical, and radiological (BCR) elements represent a silent and invisible 
class of weapons that unless detected early, could be devastating in many ways. If used as 
a weapon, any BCR agent used by terrorists to cause fear, economic downturn, and 
instability of government, followed by a loss of trust by a government’s citizens, will 
have served the purpose of the terrorist mission. 
1. Evidence from Afghanistan 
Evidence from Afghanistan showed the direct link some terrorist organizations 
have in their intent to use food, agriculture, and water as vectors to deliver biological and 
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chemical weapons of destruction. Documents have been found showing a desire to 
damage agriculture, animal livestock, plant production, and water supplies (Williams, 
2005). Figure 7 shows a diagram found in an Afghanistan cave during the war against Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban during Operation Anaconda in 2002.  
 
 
Figure 7.   Documents Found in Afghanistan Caves during Operation Anaconda in 
2002 (From: Williams, 2005). 
The Great Depression and the Dust Bowl have given us historical evidence of a 
weakened economy disrupted by problems with the food infrastructure (Public 
Broadcasting Service, 2008). Awareness of the destructive powers of even small weapons 
of mass destruction in the form of microorganisms, toxins, and radioisotopes requires 
vigilance and knowledge of the agents themselves and an understanding of the possible 
vectors in the food infrastructure.  
What form of agent should be our primary focus of preparation for an attack on 
the food and agricultural sector, biological, chemical, or radiological? All have the same 
potential and can be delivered in the same manner. Each one has its own unique signature 
and path to cause harm. Some may cause illnesses to appear slowly, while others may 
cause illnesses to occur rapidly. All, however, have the potential to cause fear, panic, and 
death and therefore should be treated as equals when it comes to protection of the food 
supply. Weapons of mass destruction do not have to be only in the form of big bang 
explosions. Sometimes big things come in the form of small packages, in this case 
biological, chemical, and radiological forms, unseen but deadly. 
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2.  Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Materials as Weapons 
“Biological weapons pose a far more serious long-term terrorist threat to the West 
than nuclear weapons, according to Washington's leading counter-terrorism expert” 
(Coughlin, 2006). This statement was from an article in the Daily Telegraph newspaper 
from an interview in January 2006 with Henry Crumpton, the head of the U.S. State 
Department’s counter-terrorism program. While he led with the statement about 
biological weapons, Crumpton discussed the concept of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) including chemicals, radiological, and nuclear materials. Crumpton made an 
interesting statement in the interview that shows that the small size of these materials and 
the small size of terrorist cells themselves do not translate into an ineffective weapon.  
We are talking about micro targets such as al Qa'ida, which when 
combined with WMD, have a macro impact. I rate the probability of terror 
groups using WMD [to attack Western targets] as very high. It is simply a 
question of time. (Coughlin, 2006)  
Food and agricultural products fit the profile of a perfect vector for these often 
invisible elements in the microbiological, chemical, and radionuclear world.7 
Attacks have been documented showing the use of the food as a vector for 
delivery. One documented case was the contamination of restaurant salad bars in Dalles, 
Oregon, with Salmonella in 1984 to influence an election (Burton & Stewart, 2008).  
While there have been no documented terrorist attacks on U.S. agriculture, 
the number and variety of foodborne illnesses and crop and livestock 
diseases may make it hard to distinguish terrorist attacks from natural 
events. For instance, it took a year for U.S. officials to conclude that the 
Oregon attack was deliberate. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006) 
Mohtadi and Murshid (2006), in a white paper supported by a U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security grant, presented a chronology of global incidents from 1950 to 2005 
in which attacks using biological, chemical, radioactive, and nuclear materials were 
                                                 
7 Except for chemicals that may impart an odor, almost all microbes and radioactive materials present 
at a level that could cause harm when used, are not visible to the naked eye or noticeable by smell. In 
almost all cases, including toxins released by bacteria, detection is only possible by laboratory analysis 
and/or specialized equipment. 
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carried out. In their collation of information on incidents involving chemical, biological, 
radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) materials from several terrorism and non-terrorism 
databases around the world, they created a dataset of their own showing the chronology 
of events. While the data represent a collection of intentional contamination events and 
attempts, they do not convey that the activities were perpetuated by known terrorist 
groups. Further analysis of their datasets brought up an interesting thought of how one 
would distinguish a terrorist act from a criminal act with the use of CBRN. This question 
is important when discussing the use of the food products as a vector of terrorism. The 
question would be whether the intentional contamination is an individual lone wolf 
incident, a group incident based on criminal activity alone, a hate crime, or for creating 
fear to cause ideological or political change. Either way, protection of the food supply 
and prevention of intentional and unintentional contamination are the ultimate goals. The 
collation of information by Mohtadi and Murshid helps establish a history of 
contamination with the intent to cause harm using food, agricultural, and water supply 
vectors.  
Their eventual total number of events where CBRN-materials were used totaled 
448 (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2006). One item that makes their dataset unique from the 
others used in their research is that it excludes CBRN-material data from hoaxes. This 
difference helps distinguish the factual nature of CBRN-material use from theoretical use. 
Analysis of the research done by Mohtadi and Murshid for the thesis showed 81 separate 
cases, both domestic and foreign, in which food, agriculture, or water were used as 
vectors to deliver biological, chemical, and radioactive materials to cause harm, death, or 
political statements. Additional research indicating use of biological and chemical agents 
used as weapons in the food and agriculture reinforce the concern for the sectors 
importance in national security. The James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies 
in Monterey, California, lists a timeline of chemical and biological use events in food and 




This list contains allegations and threats, along with confirmed incidents, 
of deliberate use of chemical or biological agents to contaminate the food 
supply at any point of the ‘food continuum’ from harvest or production to 
the consumer, with the intent to cause death, sickness, or economic 
damage. (James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2006)  
The last incident in the CNS list was on October 15, 2003, when an unknown 
suspect left a vial of Ricin at a Greenville, SC, postal facility with threats to dump Ricin 
into national water supplies. The incident was close to home and involved the public 
health function of this thesis author’s state public health agency. 
a. Biological Agents—Microorganisms 
The use of biological materials, poses a threat of great proportion. History 
has shown what microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, fungal agents, and proteins8 
prevalent in nature are capable of great harm to humans, plants, and animals. If attacks 
from terrorist groups are meant to cause harm, fear, or devastation, biological agents 
provide a good strategy. Food and agriculture provide a vector appropriate for 
microorganisms because of the growth potential. Potentially hazardous foods such as 
meats and some fruits and vegetables provide an environment capable of supporting the 
growth of microorganisms. The CDC lists bioterrorism agents in three categories. The 
three categories are separated depending on how easily they can be spread and the 
severity of illness or death they cause. Category A agents are considered the highest risk, 
and Category C agents are considered emerging threats for disease (U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2007). The following are categories of bioterrorism 
agents as defined by the CDC. 
(1) Category A (Anthrax, Botulism Toxin, Tulmarmia). These 
high priority agents include organisms or toxins that pose the highest risk to the public 
and national security because of the following. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Proteins can be in the form of toxins such as the toxin produced by Clostridium botulinum. There are 
also the Prions (proteins) responsible for “Mad Cow Disease” and their human varients. 
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• They can be easily spread or transmitted from person to person 
• They result in high death rates and have the potential for major 
public health impact 
• They might cause public panic and social disruption 
• They require special action for public health preparedness 
(2) Category B (Brucellosis, Clostridium perfringens, 
Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, Shigella, Ricin, Vibrio, Cyrptosporidium, Staphylococcal 
enterotoxin B). These agents are the second highest priority because of the following. 
• They are moderately easy to spread 
• They result in moderate illness rates and low death rates 
• They require specific enhancements of CDC's laboratory capacity 
and enhanced disease monitoring 
(3) Category C (Nipah Virus and Hantavirus). These third 
highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass 
spread because of the following. 
• They are easily available 
• They are easily produced and spread 
• They have potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and 
major health impact 
According to CDC,  
a bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other 
germs (agents) used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants. 
These agents are typically found in nature, but it is possible that they could 
be changed to increase their ability to cause disease, make them resistant 
to current medicines, or to increase their ability to be spread into the 
environment. Biological agents can be spread through the air, through 
water, or in food. Terrorists may use biological agents because they can 
be extremely difficult to detect and do not cause illness for several hours 
to several days. (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007)  
Biological agents can be covertly added to food or water, and except for 
some biological agents, they are relatively low risk for the handler. 
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b. Chemical Agents 
Chemicals can be used for human and animal harm, to destroy crops, and 
contaminate soil used to grow grains, fruits, and vegetables.  
An example of chemicals used to destroy plant life was Agent Orange, 
Agent White, and Agent Blue during the Vietnam Conflict to protect U. S. military from 
the enemy who used the surrounding foliage for cover (U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 2003). Our own country’s use of these herbicides shows what could be done with 
chemicals to destroy agriculture and contaminate soil used in planting. If given the 
opportunity, terrorists could cause disruption in the growth of vegetables and fruits in 
specific areas. The Salinas Valley area of California, called the nation’s salad bowl, is 
one area where an attack could be devastating. In recent years, links to biological 
contamination in spinach and lettuce crops from E. coli and Salmonella had an economic 
effect on the industry in the area where the crops were grown (Shinn, 2006). A chemical 
destruction or contamination would have a similar effect. One case that was in the 
international news was the suspected use of chemicals to influence an election, 
specifically the use of dioxin in the poisoning of Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor 
Yushchenko in 2004 (Holley, 2007).  
c. Radiological Agents 
There have been a few cases of radiological agents used for intentional 
contamination of food. With access to radiological materials available from medical 
equipment and for medical treatment, the potential for use of these agents is highly 
possible. While some materials would be hard to handle since the perpetrators themselves 
would be at risk of contamination, radiological agents would be an effective choice of 
weapon because of two factors. First, the reality of any material of a radioactive nature 
found in the food, agricultural, and water supply would bring about fear that could result 
in anxiety if the source were not quickly identified. Second, the use of radioactive 
materials by terrorists using nuclear material could result in mass panic and a fear that 
government is not able to protect its citizens. 
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There has been one prominent recent case involving people from the 
former Soviet block of countries and the use of radioactive materials as a weapon in food 
and water. The case involved the radiological poisoning of former Russian spy Alexander 
Litvinenko with Polonium 210. An article in the Washington Post reported that John 
Henry, a toxicologist, was asked by Litvinenko's family to investigate the case. Henry, 
who examined Litvinenko before his death, said the type of polonium involved is “only 
found in government-controlled institutions.” In an interview, Henry called Polonium 210 
an “extraordinary poison” that is lethal in doses so small “you can lose it on the point of a 
pin” (Jordan & Finn, 2006). Radiological agents cannot be ruled out as weapon for use in 
food. 
E.  CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
Biological agents that affect the health of humans, animals, and plants are readily 
available. As seen in recent stories in the media, biological contaminants have had an 
impact on regulatory agencies and they have struggled to handle the unintentional 
outbreaks of illnesses associated with these agents promptly. It has been difficult for the 
federal regulatory community to keep up with the pressure created by the rash of illness 
outbreaks associated with unintentional contamination of food and agricultural products. 
Imagine the potential problems that would appear if intentional contaminations were to 
occur by terrorists. Would the complex web of regulatory agencies be prepared to handle 
this added threat? Would a change in our regulatory structure help to shape smarter and 
better strategies for food safety and the defense of the food and agricultural 
infrastructure? To answer that question, in the next chapter, we will look at comparisons 
of what others have done to improve food safety and at the experience of countries with 
similar ideas of government and food protection. 
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V. WHAT OTHERS ARE DOING—A COMPARISON  
A. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE OTHER COUNTRIES 
Before recommending policy changes for the regulatory authority of the United 
States food safety/defense system, it is reasonable to study similar democratic and 
developed countries with established food safety regulatory programs. The three 
countries chosen here for comparison are the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. 
The first two countries are part of the European Union and are committed to achieving 
compliance with food safety standards as developed by the European Union’s (EU) 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) formed in 2002 (European Food Safety 
Authority, 2002). While the use of standards developed by the EFSA are not obligatory 
for any of the member states, the trade policies and food safety standards were developed 
by the participating states, and the general agreement has been that countries generally 
follow the standards in order to coalesce the free flow of trade between the member 
countries without added restrictions.9  
The third country, Canada, is an established trading partner that follows similar 
guidelines to those set by the European Food Safety Authority. It is included since it is a 
major trading partner with countries in the European Union and with the United States. 
The close relationship Canada has with the United States, the similar historical timeline 
of development in both countries, and our shared border also factor into the comparison. 
All three countries’ governments have embraced a single (or smaller) food safety 
agency culture and streamlined their respective food safety responsibilities. These 
changes were based on events that led to a loss of public confidence in how some of these 
countries handled food safety incidents such as “Mad Cow” disease in the 1990s and 
2000. Over time, the development of relationships in the European community of states, 
the need for smooth flow of trade and food products across the now open borders 
between all European Union countries, made the issue of streamlined food protection 
                                                 
9 The European Union and its European Food Safety Authority have been important in pressing food 
safety changes throughout the European Continent. 
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more important. The events of 9/11 have elevated the need for more precise oversight of 
all critical infrastructures to include the food and agricultural infrastructure of all 
countries (Food Navigator, 2003). 
While all three countries are democratic, the way their respective governments 
have handled the traditional responsibilities to food safety have varied. 
B. EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES 
1. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom consolidated its food safety system after a loss of public 
confidence in food safety that largely resulted from the appearance of mishandling food 
safety responsibilities with the discovery of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), 
better known as “Mad Cow Disease” in cattle. When the human form variant of BSE, 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, caused 35 deaths in 1999, concern for food safety increased 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). It was widely believed by the public that a 
fragmented and decentralized food safety system allowed this outbreak to occur. 
Consumers believed that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, which had dual 
responsibilities to promote the agricultural and food industry and to regulate food safety, 
favored industry over consumers in making decisions. This perception by U.K. 
consumers prompted change in the food safety system. The pattern of improved 
consumer confidence and the reliability of the single food safety agency system to 
improved industry compliance are important elements to remember as the U.K. system is 
also compared to system changes in Germany and Canada. Legislation went into effect 
on April 3, 2000, that established an independent Food Standards Agency in the U.K. 
(Food Standards Agency, 2000). 
Before reorganization of the U.K.’s food safety system in 2000, food safety 
responsibilities were divided among several central government departments, such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food and the Department of Health, as well as 
local authorities. The Meat Hygiene Service, a subunit of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, and Food was responsible for meat inspections, including enforcement of 
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hygiene in slaughterhouses. Other food inspections conducted by local authorities 
received no oversight from the central government. So in order to address public 
concerns, the Parliament passed the Food Standards Act of 1999 to establish the 
independent Food Standards Agency (FSA) as the country’s leading food safety agency. 
The Meat Hygiene Service was moved out of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Food and placed within FSA as well (GAO, 2005). FSA was granted audit authority over 
local enforcement at this time (Food Standards Agency, 2008). This is an interesting 
comparison because it indicates that the local and regional elements will be checked for 
standardization to the country as a whole when before they had not. This is an important 
element of consistency in standards and transparency of efforts. 
FSA is now responsible for scientific risk assessments, risk management, standard 
setting, education, and public outreach in the United Kingdom. The Meat Hygiene 
Service, now a component of FSA, is responsible for meat inspections. For other foods, 
FSA forms inspection policy and audits local inspection authorities. FSA has the power 
of an agency in a ministry, but is not part of a ministry, which gives it independence from 
other ministry influence thought to be political. 
The agency however, has accountability to the Westminster Parliament and 
devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland through Health 
Ministers. Also, an independent board consists of a Chairman, a Deputy Chair, and up to 
12 other members appointed to act collectively in the public interest. The Board manages 
the FSA and determines food policy and holds discussions on policy issues in public 
meetings. 
In general, the establishment of FSA improved the food safety system because the 
agency has made the system more transparent (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). 
FSA has increased public education about food safety. The most significant result of the 
consolidation was a shift from an industry focus to a consumer focus on food safety 
matters (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). The consolidation appears to have also 
increased accountability within the food safety system. A key element here, other than 
those already mentioned, is the increase in education to the public on food safety. A  
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consolidated approach allows for a more consistent educational message. Another key 
element is that consumers feel more confident that the government is there to protect their 
food supply and not the industry’s profits (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). 
2.  Germany 
Germany’s creation of a new food safety regulatory system involved a three-
pronged response for food safety improvement. The first was in response to public 
concerns about handling of finding BSE, or “Mad Cow Disease” in cattle in 2000, other 
food safety concerns, and a new commitment to improve compliance with new European 
Union (EU) food safety legislation.10 In 2002, the German parliament approved creation 
of two new food safety agencies in response. Both new agencies are in the Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food, and Agriculture (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2005). 
Before consolidation, Germany’s food safety system, responsibilities for research, 
risk assessment, and communication were shared by the Federal Ministry of Health and 
the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry. Responsibility for 
implementation of federal legislation and oversight of inspections were shared by each of 
the 16 federal German states, and inspections were performed by municipalities and other 
local governments (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). This is important in 
comparison to the United States. When analyzing the former food safety system with the 
present system, and then comparing both to the U.S. system, the old system had a distinct 
resemblance to the United States. The former food safety system agencies had different 
regulations and responsibilities depending on the food commodity. 
The new agencies under the auspices of FMCPFA are the Federal Office of 
Consumer Protection and Food Safety, a coordinating body responsible for leading food 
safety risk management (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). It serves as Germany’s 
contact point with the European Commission, acting as a coordinator of audits of 
                                                 
10 As previously stated this is non-binding or non-obligatory legislation, however trade from one 
member state to another can be streamlined through common acceptance of the legislation into a country’s 
own food safety legislation. 
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compliance with EU food safety legislation and implementing in Germany, the European 
Rapid Alert System for consumer health protection and food safety.11 In addition, this 
agency’s responsibilities include coordinating food safety surveillance at the federal level 
and formulating general administrative rules to guide the implementation of national food 
safety laws by the German federal states. The federal states continue to be responsible for 
implementation of food safety legislation and oversight of food inspections performed by 
local governments. With one agency serving as the contact point for those departments 
under its umbrella, this provides for better information sharing both horizontally and 
vertically through one entity, not only within Germany, but also to its global and regional 
country trading partners. This helps provide a unified and consistent standard and method 
for internal and external communication. 
The other new food safety agency is the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, 
whose responsibilities include providing impartial scientific advice and support for the 
law-making activities and policies of the federal government in all fields concerning food 
safety and consumer health protection, except for animal diseases. This office performs 
risk assessments and communicates risk assessment results to the general public. 
According to officials, this agency was created to separate risk assessments from decision 
making.12 The purpose of this separation was to increase public confidence in risk 
assessments by distancing these assessments from possible political interference. 
Negotiations between the federal government and the federal states concerning reform of 
food safety law were complicated, because some reforms that would give the federal 
government increased authority required constitutional changes. Once again, this change 
in Germany compares favorably to the same importance that the United Kingdom and 
Canada placed in separating risk assessment from risk management while under one 
oversight agency. This shows again the power of consolidation in the food safety/food 
security/food defense arena. 
                                                 
11 Similar to the United States Health and Human Services CDC Health Alert Network. 
12 Similar to the Canadian risk assessment and separation of its food safety agency responsibilities. 
However they are linked. 
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The German food industry and consumer organization stakeholders have 
supported the consolidation. The German food industry, in general, supports the creation 
of the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety because it has increased 
coordination of the federal states’ food safety activities and has improved Germany’s 
ability to respond to potential food safety crises, including improvement of Germany’s 
ability to prevent potential food safety crises. In consideration of impending EU 
legislation, the food industry advocated increasing the authority of the Federal Office of 
Consumer Protection and Food Safety to coordinate the federal states’ food safety 
activities, thus enabling increased harmonization of food safety standards and control 
procedures across states (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). The food industry also 
viewed the separation of risk assessment and risk management to giving the food safety 
system more credibility in the public and industry eyes. The consolidation seems to have 
made the food safety system more effective (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). 
Consumer representatives appear to see that the consolidation has increased German 
consumers’ confidence, though they have less confidence than consumers do in other 
European countries. Consumer organizations favor giving the Federal Office of 
Consumer Protection and Food Safety increased authority (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2005). One key aspect of the Germany comparison was the concept that the 
system was more effective than the previous food safety system. 
C. NORTH AMERICA 
1. Canada 
Canada originally had food safety tasks shared between three separate but viable 
agencies—the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Health Canada, and Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). Each of these agencies 
originally had its own food safety inspection system, food policy, and risk assessment 
responsibilities. With each entity having similar responsibilities, there was confusion 
about who was in charge of what. Industry had to respond to several different inspection 
compliance and enforcement requests. With multiple inspection types and compliance 
policies, it was difficult to remember who required what and how to correct the 
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compliance requirements adequately. There was no clarification of responsibilities and 
there was a perceived lack of confidence by consumers and the industry in the 
consistency of enforcement of the food safety laws.  
When the Canadian Parliament approved the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA) Act in 1997, the country appeared to have a solution to improve consistency in 
food safety (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). Out of this Act, Canada created the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2007). What is 
interesting is how this affected food safety responsibilities and structure. All agricultural 
and food industry components of inspection were consolidated to remove the basis for the 
question of why there were multiple inspection agencies. The goal and reasoning for 
consolidation by Canadian lawmakers and policymakers was that by joining once 
separate entities, there would now be clarification of the responsibilities of each segment 
of the food chain. Additionally, there would be improved effectiveness and consistency in 
inspections and enforcement. Duplication of inspection and overlap of food regulatory 
activities would be reduced and efficiency improved. They hoped that consolidation 
would also reduce federal spending. It may be too early to say if this has been successful 
since there is little open source information on spending. In 2004, additional reform 
legislation was introduced that contained commodity-specific laws. The effect was a 
strengthening and added consistency on interpretation of requirements for eight different 
food commodities. It also was positive toward inspection and enforcement capabilities, 
allowing authorities to hold suspicious food products for testing and the time needed for 
return of results. Once confirmation is received that the food is safe to consume, it is then 
allowed to be released for sale or distribution. This authority is relevant and important to 
regulators and food safety, especially with imported food and cases where intentional 
contamination of food product may be an issue. 
One other interesting event occurred with the change in the food safety laws. 
While the system is designed to work as a single agency, there are actually two entities 
that are interlinked—the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) already mentioned 
and Health Canada. This is an important distinction when analyzing the food safety 
changes. The CFIA consolidated all of the inspection activities of the former agencies, 
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while Health Canada was given the responsibility of setting food safety standards, 
performing food safety research, and risk assessments (Health Canada, 2004). In essence, 
CFIA is responsible for risk management and Health Canada is responsible for risk 
assessments. 
Thus, while there is separation of agencies between CFIA and Health Canada, 
they are linked by law and dependence on each other. Health Canada can concentrate on 
independent scientific research and analysis of food risk factors and set standards based 
on the scientific process. CFIA can focus on inspection and enforcement or risk 
management. The standards they enforce will be consistent across all food commodities. 
The fox will no longer also be guarding the hen house, so to speak. This change made for 
positive feedback from the food industry and the consuming public. 
Changes have been positive for consumers and the industry. Food industry 
stakeholders were consistently supportive of Canada’s consolidation. Among the 
consolidation, related benefits they cited were improved communication; better 
interaction with regulators through having a single contact for enforcement and 
compliance; clarification of responsibilities; and increased consistency in the 
enforcement of food safety laws (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2005). While 
expressing overall support for the consolidation, representatives of some food industry 
organizations cited a need for timely decision-making. 
One negative comment about this new way of handling food safety issues from 
industry representatives was that on specific matters, industry may have to wait 
excessively long periods for issues of risk management to be resolved. CFIA had to wait 
for a food safety question on a standard to be answered by Health Canada. Added to that 
comment, the same industry representatives stated that Health Canada’s setting standards 
should better reflect CIBA’s ability to enforce the standard (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2005). This concern can be addressed as more time is allowed for the new system 
to work. However, from personal experience, the last issue is debatable, for even the 
smallest challenges to food safety laws may require legislative or regulatory changes that 
take time to process. The change to streamline and separate risk assessment from risk  
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management in this case study remains, for this analysis, a positive change. It is worth 
studying because of the influence that Canada’s new system may have in an evaluation of 
the need for changes to the U.S. food safety system. 
D. SUMMARY 
By comparing the single food safety regulatory systems that have been created in 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, we have looked at examples of what can be 
done to streamline and improve the food safety system. These countries all had multiple 
agencies originally, similar to those in the United States. Germany has a system of 
government that closely resembles our own, with a national government structure and a 
state government structure. In particular, the new food safety structure created by 
Germany shows that a system of federal and state systems could be realigned to create a 
flow from a single regulatory system that can work with existing state structures. Once 
such a single food safety agency is created, regulations can be more consistent between 
federal and state food regulatory authorities. For the United Kingdom and Germany, in 
particular, who were members of the European Union (EU), creation of a single (or 
smaller) food safety agency and reporting bodies has been extremely beneficial to all 
countries in the EU. Benefits have included similar food safety strategies and policies, 
even with different governmental structures and overarching laws. Safety inspections and 
delivery of imported and exported food supplies between the countries is hastened 
because of agreements that each country follows in their respective food safety laws and 
food safety structures by using similar protocols. This has been influenced by laws 
established by the European Food Safety Authority (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2008). With a distinct food safety agency structure and consistency of system 
governance, it eliminates the confusion about what other agencies are doing and what 
their roles are in their respective countries.  
There will always be arguments among policy and decision-makers from the 
agencies representing the food safety regulatory system in the United States that the 
countries discussed are smaller and less complex than ours in the United States (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 2005). Some may argue that the cost of restructuring would 
be a tremendous strain on the budget and staff. However, preliminary results show that 
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there have been cost benefits, especially with staff retirements and small organizational 
shifts as well as reduced needs for equipment and documents (regulations) (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2005). 
These comparisons show that change is possible without major disruption. The 
concepts and definitions of food safety, food defense, and food security can benefit from 
a single entity where risk management and risk assessment systems can be integrated to 
create a streamlined approach to prevent foodborne illnesses. This concept also meets the 
global view of food safety/security and may lead to better coordination with the United 
States and its global food safety regulatory partners.  
The comparative analysis highlights the fact that bold initiatives such as 
realignment and structural changes are possible in the food safety arena without total 
disruption of the government’s ability to protect consumers and the industry. While 
continued study is needed as data are collected by the countries studied on the efficiency 
of the changes made to long-standing regulatory structures, the benefit of movement to a 
single (or smaller) footprint for governmental food safety oversight has increased 
consumer confidence in how the government handles food safety (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2008). Also, while under a single entity there has been a 
separation of risk assessment from risk management, which has created a transparency 
that has benefited both industry and consumer and developed a new sense of confidence 
in the government’s posture on protecting its citizens. The comparison countries show 
how strong leadership and the desire to protect its citizens influenced the call for the 
positive change made in each country and the EU as a whole. This shows a trend toward 
positive change in a global perspective (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008).  
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VI. PATHS TO CHANGE—WHAT OTHERS ARE PROPOSING 
A. INTRODUCTION TO CHANGE—PATHS ALREADY FOLLOWED 
There appears to be a persistent resistance to change. The idea of creating a single 
food safety agency to oversee protection and defense of the U.S. food and agricultural 
supply is perceived by some critics to have the potential to become a bureaucratic 
nightmare. Some agency leaders disagree with the idea that the system needs repair. In 
2007, Dr. David Kessler, former FDA commissioner under presidents George H. W. 
Bush and Bill Clinton, told the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, 
“Simply put, our food safety system in this country is broken. … The fact is that food 
safety has been a second-tier priority within the FDA.” Dr. Andrew C. von Eschenbach, 
the current FDA commissioner, took issue with Kessler. “I disagree that the food safety 
system is broken,” he told the panel, “we will never have a 100% fail-safe” system 
(Alonso-Zaldivar & Goldman, 2007).”  
1. Two Paths of Change Already Followed 
The creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the 
secretary of Homeland Security shows that the process of creating a new agency at the 
executive branch level of the U.S. government can be achieved quickly (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008). This example also shows the president’s authority to create 
cabinet-level positions within the executive branch under Article II of the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007).  
Additionally, if questions about transparency are raised, an alternative solution 
besides a cabinet-level position could be an independent agency. The process to create an 
independent agency at the executive level follows a similar path, and it would also be 
possible to establish such an agency quickly in this manner. In 1970, when there was 
concern for environmental and health issues for water and air, the Environmental 
Protection Agency was created as an independent body to help alleviate concerns of 
nontransparency under President Nixon’s administration (Lewis, 2007). 
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Another seemingly impossible consolidation was creation of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). President George W. Bush signed four 
Executive Orders in August 2004, which strengthened and reformed the intelligence 
community to the extent that the President can without legislation. Shortly thereafter, 
both houses of Congress passed bills with major amendments to the National Security 
Act of 1947. Reconciliation of both bills led to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 signed into law by President Bush on December 17, 2004. After 
appointment and confirmation of the first DNI in February 2005 and swearing into office 
in April 2005, the ODNI opened for business on April 22 of the same year (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2008a). 
The ODNI was established to create a vision of “a globally networked and 
integrated intelligence enterprise,” with a mission to “create decision advantage” through 
a strategy of “integrating foreign, military, and domestic intelligence capabilities through 
policy, personnel, and technology actions to provide decision advantage to policymakers, 
warfighters, homeland security officials and law enforcement personnel,” with 
Commitment, Courage, and Collaboration.” (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2008) The office has oversight, from a homeland security perspective, of the 
combined collection of vital information from the intelligence community representative 
of 16 different intelligence organizations. The collaborative nature of the new agency, 
while on the surface seemingly difficult to accept in such a secretive society, now 
represents an example of what can be achieved and offers an example for beginning a 
process of reformation in the food and agricultural regulatory structure. These examples 
show what is possible in government restructuring. Let us start with three ideas of how 
these examples can lead us to creation of a food safety oversight agency, since that is the 
focus of this thesis. 
2. Potential Paths for Change Described 
Three possible paths could be followed in formation of an oversight agency.  
Path one is the creation of an oversight agency that incorporates existing agencies 
or departments with similar functions along with various components of other agencies 
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that directly link to the primary mission of the new agency. Most of the original agencies 
would stay intact and carry out their primary missions, but could operate under the 
umbrella of the new oversight agency. Some agency components could be dissolved from 
their original agencies and would become a part of the oversight agencies command 
organization. The DHS and the EPA (with its original role of protector of air and water 
resources) are examples of this type of oversight agency. 
Path two is the creation of an oversight authority with the responsibility of 
managing other agencies with similar tasks. All of the communities placed under this 
type of agency would remain separate in their day-to-day missions, but would be aligned 
on overarching issues through collaboration. In the business world, an example of this 
would be a parent company that owns several food companies. Each company might 
produce separate products and be governed from within by their own management 
structures. The parent company, however, would control the direction of the community 
as a whole. In the intelligence community, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence is an example of this type of oversight agency and is the equivalent of a 
parent company. It has a vested interest in the success of the companies (agencies or 
departments with intelligence functions, whole or partial) under its guidance. 
Path three is the creation of an oversight agency, which, as in path one, takes over 
specific functions from existing agencies or departments that are related to the new 
agency’s mission. Path three differs in how the new agency controls all authority. The 
components of the new agency would be melded into one. The new agency would control 
and guide a specific area of expertise, combining all toward a new mission dedicated to a 
particular function. Examples of this in industry are Daimler-Chrysler and U.S. Airways-
American West Airlines. Their mergers created new automobile and airline companies, 
respectively, with similar missions. Both companies operate under the same rules. The 
purpose of the mergers in both cases was to consolidate into a more efficient company.  
All three paths have the potential for success. The question is, however, which 
would be the right path to follow if a new food safety oversight agency were to become a 
reality? Our thesis analysis to this point has examined three areas.  
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In this chapter, we survey legislation being introduced in the United States, which 
indicates that changes in the food safety regulatory system, in whole or in part, is being 
considered. Several bills by the 110th Congress were proposed to enhance, improve, or 
change the U.S. food safety regulatory system. Consumer advocacy groups have also 
called for the food protection regulatory system to be restructured into a more 
streamlined system (Center for Science in the Public Interest, 2008). 
One problem with the legislative proposals for the food safety regulatory system 
is the sheer volume of legislation proposals. The 110th Congress considered more than 
2,000 pieces of legislation related to food. Keyword searches at the U.S. Library of 
Congress Web site (2008) and other Web sites using word combinations that include 
food, agriculture, food safety, agricultural safety, food defense, agriculture defense, food 
security, agricultural security, and food and agricultural terrorism revealed a plethora of 
legislative proposals and bills. Several bills related to food safety and defense were 
slanted toward protection of the food supply by creation of two of the three paths here 
described and were still in committee. The Durbin-Delauro Bill entitled the “Safe Food 
Act of 2007” [S. 654 IS and H.R. 1148 IH] would follow path three, while the Burr-
Collins Senate Bill entitled “National Agriculture and Food Defense Act of 2007” would 
follow path two.  
The conduit for legislation introduced into both bodies of Congress is long and 
tedious. This is one of the obstacles in creating a new oversight agency beyond the 
authority of the president without consensus (U.S. Library of Congress, 2003 Revised). 
A proposed bill, of course, cannot become a law until it has been approved by 
both the Senate and the House. After a bill has passed both chambers, it must then be 
made identical by a conference committee (U.S. Library of Congress, 2003 Revised). The 
bill would then be sent to the President for signature, and if signed, it would then become 
law. The mechanism forward to implementation of the new law could be time consuming 
and laborious (U.S. Library of Congress, 2003 Revised).  
Moving legislation out of committees is the first order of business. A search of 
bills considered by the 110th Congress and earlier sessions reveals that some of the food-
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related legislation presently in committee had been proposed in earlier sessions of 
Congress and had the same problems. None of the proposals had yet made it to the floor 
of either the House or the Senate beyond the first and second readings that are needed to 
get them introduced into the process.  
B. BILL PROPOSALS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR CHANGE 
Due to a wide range of food-related illness and food contamination issues that 
have been in the news over the past five years, the 110th Congress has stepped up a call 
for change and enhancement of the way the United States performs its regulatory 
function on food protection. The recent incidents of contaminated food products and 
foodborne illnesses have led to food protection concerns being a high agenda issue for 
some lawmakers in the 110th Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2007). The 
recent tomato and jalapeño pepper contamination and illness outbreak have increased the 
demands for change, not only from Congress, but also from consumers, consumer groups, 
and industry. Several members of Congress have introduced bills to alter the current U.S. 
food safety system and/or increase spending, which they assert is needed to protect 
consumers from unsafe food (Congressional Research Service, 2007). These issues have 
led to the large number of bills introduced in the 110th Congress. 
While more than 2,000 pieces of legislation are related to food, food safety, and 
food defense there are some proposed bills that address similar concerns and ideas to the 
conceptual model that is proposed in this thesis and alternatives that do not address the 
model, including the following bills: 
1. Enhancing the Current Regulatory System—No Widespread Change 
(Center for Science in the Public Interest, 2008) 
Some bills under consideration that would enhance the current food safety system 
are in committee. These bills represent a sampling of the proposals being introduced to 
help alleviate the burden of tackling the rash of recent outbreaks associated with products 
at the federal inspection level. Some of the proposals serve to give the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and its Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition more tools to 
engage in dealing with tracing the flow of domestic non-meat products in the farm to 
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processor and retail levels, both foreign and domestic. Some proposals would give FDA 
recall authority, the ability to require methods and mechanisms that the food industry will 
use, along with implementation plans for tracing back the origin of all food products. 
There is similar legislation being proposed for meat and poultry products to enhance the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Some of these bills are listed below, and they convey the enormity of the task of 
trying to improve the already existing regulatory structure with its many departments and 
agencies. While the bills proposed are a positive step, they do not address how the 
changes will be funded. In brief, the complexity of the regulatory system feeds off the 
complexity of the legislation that tries to enhance the system.  
• The Consumer Food Safety Act [H.R. 3624] (referred to the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce) 
• The Food and Drug Import Safety Act [H.R. 3610] (referred to the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Health) 
• The Imported Food Security Act [S. 1776] (read twice and referred to the 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry) 
• The Human and Pet Food Safety Act [S. 1274 and H.R. 2108] (read twice 
and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; 
referred to the Subcommittee on Health) 
• The Fresh Produce Safety Act [S. 2077 and H.R. 5620] (read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; 
Referred to the Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture; 
has been through two House committees and three subcommittees) 
• The Safer Meat, Poultry, and Food Act [H.R. 3484] (referred to the 
Subcommittee on Health; has been through two House committees and 
one subcommittee) 
• The Trace Act [S. 1292 and H.R. 2997] (Read twice and referred to the 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; referred to the 
Subcommittee on Health; has been through two committees and one 
subcommittee) 
• The Meat and Poultry Products Traceability and Safety Act [S. 1292 and 
H.R. 3584] (read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry; referred to the Subcommittee on Health. (Has 
been through two Committees and one Subcommittee) 
• The Assured Food Safety Act [H.R. 2997] (referred to the Subcommittee 
on Health) 
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• The Food and Product Responsibility Act [S. 2081 and H.R. 5069] (read 
twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry. Referred to the Subcommittee on Specialty Crops, Rural 
Development, and Foreign Agriculture) 
• The Food Import Safety Act [H.R. 3937] (referred to the Subcommittee on 
Health.) 
• Keeping America’s Food Safe Act of 2008 [H.R. 5827 IH] (read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry) 
• Food Safety Modernization Act [S. 3385] (read twice and referred to the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions) 
a. Summary 
The bills listed above are intended to enhance or change statutory 
regulation to existing federal food safety agencies. In essence, they do not change the 
status quo. Pending appropriations would need to go hand-in-hand with any of these 
proposals, and would keep the existing regulatory food and agricultural structure in place, 
if enacted. These bills could enhance programs, but would not answer the question of the 
need for a food safety oversight structure for the nation. 
2. Changing the Current Regulatory System—Partial or Complete 
Change to the Structure 
Congress is now considering two bills that change the current food safety system. 
One bill would enhance the new food defense mission by creating a link of administrators 
from the primary food, agriculture, and water regulatory agencies to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to monitor food defense issues related to intentional attacks on 
the food supply. This bill is closely aligned to Homeland Security Presidential Directive–
8 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive–9. 
The second bill calls for creation of a food safety administration. It would put the 
food and agricultural food safety functions that presently are under separate agencies, 
under one umbrella. The following is a brief summary of each bill.  
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a. Partial Change 
The areas below that appear to be significant are highlighted in bold. 
When warranted, questions and comments are shown in parenthesis about who would 
develop the components or notes to give the reader a sense of possible problems. 
The National Agriculture and Food Defense Act [S. 1804] 
(WashingtonWatch.com, 2008)13 (read twice and referred to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs) 
An overview of what the bill proposes to achieve in food defense is as 
follows. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) shall lead federal, state, 
local, tribal, and private efforts to enhance the protection of critical U.S. infrastructure 
and key resources, including the agriculture and food system; 
The Secretary of Agriculture shall lead federal efforts relating to 
agriculture, meat, poultry, and egg food products; 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (DHHS) shall lead federal 
efforts relating to other food products; and 
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shall 
lead federal efforts relating to drinking water and waste water. 
Establishes in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 
• A Chief Medical Officer who shall serve as the Assistant Secretary for 
Health Affairs  
• The agriculture and food defense rotational expertise program. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This bill was proposed in the 110th session of Congress. Sessions of Congress last two years, and at 
the end of each session all proposed bills and resolutions that have not passed are cleared from the books. 
The 110th Congress is about to end (2007–2008). Members often reintroduce bills that did not come up for 
debate under a new number in the next session. The 111th Congress begins in 2009 and the bill will most 
likely be reintroduced. 
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Establishes in the Department of Agriculture (USDA): 
• The position of Under Secretary for Protection, Preparedness, and 
Response 
• Directs the Secretary of HHS to coordinate the public health surveillance 
of zoonotic diseases (a CDC function under HHS) 
b. Summary 
The National Agriculture and Food Defense Act would, in summary, 
create a network with new and established administrators in DHS, USDA, HHS/FDA, 
and EPA (to a lesser degree) established to carry out functions under the direction of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security through the new Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to 
do the following. 
• Prepare a combined national agriculture and food defense 
strategy (Who are all the stakeholders that would be involved in 
combining the strategy in the venue of transparency? Will state and 
local regulatory agencies, consumer and industry groups be 
involved?) 
• Perform vulnerability assessments of the agriculture and food 
system (Who would actually carry out; DHS or separate agencies, 
or a combined force to evaluate?) 
• Implement mitigation strategies to protect critical production and 
processing nodes from diseases, pests, and poisonous agents (Who 
actually would develop the strategies?) 
• Ensure that combined federal, state, and local capabilities are 
adequate to respond to a terrorist attack, disease outbreak, or other 
disaster affecting the U.S. agriculture and food system (If not 
adequate, who would fund to make them adequate?) 
• Assist the states with food and agriculture protection activities 
(Additional funding and resource issues) 
• Establish the Food and Agriculture Government Coordinating 
Council (this is a good idea because it includes public and private 
interaction on food defense issues) 
It further directs the Secretary of Agriculture to do the following. 
• Develop a national veterinary stockpile 
• Develop a national plant disease recovery system 
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• Establish a National Veterinary Stockpile Advisory Committee 
• Carry out a program (Agricultural Biosecurity Corps) to develop 
veterinary leaders with epidemiological expertise to respond to 
animal agriculture threats 
• Develop a national plant diagnostic network 
• Develop a national food emergency response network (FDA has a 
system called FERN (Food Emergency Response Network) 
already in existence that could be enhanced. (This is a good idea if 
the FERN is enhanced. This would prevent duplication of an 
already existing system) 
• Develop a national animal health laboratory network 
• Identify an increased production capacity goal for the rendering 
industry to meet animal disposal needs following a catastrophic 
animal disease outbreak 
• Conduct a study of irradiation technology use to enhance food 
defense capabilities 
The Act also directs the administrator of EPA to provide assistance to 
state, local, and tribal governments in assessing, decontaminating, and recovering from 
an agriculture or food emergency. This is one of the few responsibilities mentioned for 
the EPA. The concern in context of the response to a food emergency is for ground water 
contamination problems from agricultural events requiring massive disposal efforts.  
There are several key points of analysis from the bill. The first is the call 
for the secretaries of DHS, USDA, and HHS/FDA to submit an integrated food safety 
defense budget. How the existing budgets can be combined regarding what each separate 
federal agency brings to the table may be significant. The budget proposals may be 
different depending on the agencies’ existing missions. There is a need for independent 
analysis of cost as a guide for discussions on a combined and integrated budget. 
Second, the weight of the bill, while integrating food defense budgets, 
leans more toward the agricultural and food responsibilities existing within USDA. There 
is less lean toward the overall existing HHS/FDA food regulatory responsibility. The bill 
directs the secretary of HHS to coordinate the public health surveillance of zoonotic 
diseases. This surveillance function would fall under HHS’s Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention. This is a positive proposal, but leaves out any responsibility for the Food 
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and Drug Administration’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), 
which is a major component of the nation’s food regulatory system for federal inspection 
of all food items other than meat and poultry, which USDA inspects. This does not imply 
that FDA and its responsibility for food safety and food defense issues are left out of the 
bill’s overarching message or plan, but it must be considered. 
Overall, the bill is a positive effort to respond to the issues of agricultural 
and food defense issues and should be considered by Congress. It is a first step in the 
right direction in integrating the new food defense mission in protecting the food and 
agricultural infrastructure. While it does not address the overarching research questions 
of this thesis on the need for a single food safety oversight agency or administration, the 
proposed legislation does focus attention on the critical nature of the food and 
agricultural infrastructure and its protection. Integration of the three existing departments 
or administrations through the Department of Homeland Security for food defense does 
create a missing link that would be tied to law for collaboration on this important issue. 
The track of this bill would keep the existing food, agricultural 
departments, and agencies intact, but it would create administrative positions at the 
secretary and administrator level at each agency. However, creation of direct links 
specific to the food defense missions of each department or agency at USDA and 
HHS/FDA merits expedited consideration by Congress. 
c. Complete Change 
As in the partial change section of the chapter, the areas in this section that 
appear to be significant are highlighted in bold. When warranted, questions and 
comments are underlined regarding who would develop the components or notes. This 




The Safe Food Act [S. 654 IS and H.R. 1148 IH] (U.S. Library of 
Congress, 2008b)14 (read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 
and Forestry) Referred to the Subcommittee on Health. (Has been through two House 
Committees and one Subcommittee) 
The bill as proposed would move the nation toward a single oversight 
agency. 
• Would establish a Food Safety Administration to administer and enforce 
food safety laws 
• Develop new regulation to ensure security of the food supply 
• Implement federal food safety inspection, enforcement, and research 
efforts in the name of public health 
• Develop consistent and science-based standards for safe foods 
• Prioritize resources at the federal level in both effort and deployment for 
the highest benefit of reducing foodborne illness 
d. Summary 
The Safe Food Act would create a new agency to provide oversight of all 
food safety functions by integrating previous food safety and defense functions from the 
USDA, HHS/FDA, EPA, DOC, and other ancillary federal food safety programs under 
the umbrella of one administration. Specifically, the bill would transfer to the new 
administration all functions of specified federal agencies that relate to the administration 
or enforcement of food safety laws. The legislation upon enactment would require the 
new administrator to do the following. 
• Administer a national food safety program based on an analysis of the 
hazards associated with different food and the processing of different 
food. (This approach can be and is important to consistency, transparency, 
and providing for a streamlined risk-based approach to food safety and 
defense. This approach would also be consistent with food protection 
based on scientific research and known evidence of food-related hazards 
                                                 
14 This bill was proposed in the 110th session of Congress. Sessions of Congress last two years, and at 
the end of each session all proposed bills and resolutions that have not passed are cleared from the books. 
The 110th Congress is about to end (2007–2008). Members often reintroduce bills that did not come up for 
debate under a new number in the next session. The 111th Congress begins in 2009 and the bill will most 
likely be reintroduced. 
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and to the administration of policy and regulation that provides the tools 
and consistency necessary for collective and collaborative food safety and 
defense) 
• Establish standards for food processors and food establishments. 
(Important to standardizing risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication across all food commodities and levels of regulation, 
federal to state to local) 
• Establish a certification system for foreign governments or food 
establishments seeking to import food to the United States. (Will help 
establish food safety standards, at least on process equal to or better than 
the U.S. regulation) 
• Establish requirements for tracing food and food producing animals 
from point of origin to retail sale. (The ability to trace food back to its 
original starting point is critical to timely reduction of illness. If the source 
of the illness can be identified along its route in the supply chain, the 
spread of the potential illness can be reduced or even prevented. Random 
sampling of commodities listed below can also help track potential 
problems) 
• Maintain an active surveillance system of food, food products, and 
epidemiological evidence. (Important to the identification of illnesses and 
tracking of the actual pathogens or chemicals responsible for an illness. 
Surveillance and epidemiological evidence are important to both 
preventing the spread of disease and identifying and stopping disease from 
spreading once it has started) 
• Establish a sampling system to monitor contaminants in food 
• Rank and analyze hazards in the food supply 
• Establish a national public education campaign on food safety. (The 
importance of education cannot be overemphasized in the context of food 
safety and food defense. Continuous education, training, and 
transparency through these programs provide for the involvement of all 
stakeholders and relay the message that food safety and food defense is 
truly a farm-to-plate collaborative effort) 
• Conduct research relating to food safety. (Science and technology of 
existing hazards and innovations to detect and prevent pathogens and 
chemicals before reaching the farms, processing plants, and consumers at 
the retail level are essential to a preventive program through preparation 
and response. This is “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” 
philosophy) 
The Food Safety Act also sets forth provisions regarding prohibited acts, 
administrative detention, condemnation, temporary holds, recall, penalties for violations 
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of food safety laws, whistle-blower protection, and civil actions. These provisions will 
provide the authority that some of the existing food safety regulatory agencies do not 
currently have, specifically, enforcement and protection authority that is well defined.  
The bill as written would set up a system based on hazards responsible for 
illnesses from different foods under one roof, standardize requirements for processors, 
and establish certification protocols for importers. The Safe Food Act would also 
establish a much needed protocol for tracking food products and maintain an active 
surveillance program on foods to keep sight of trends in food-related illnesses. Creation 
of food-sampling and ranking systems for food hazards would help create a knowledge 
base on agents that are responsible for foodborne illnesses and their potentials. 
Establishment of a national public education campaign on food safety and research on 
food products will be vital to the success of food protection. 
If illness outbreaks occur on a national level, provisions regarding the 
prohibition of acts related to non-food safety compliance, added strength for 
administrative detention, condemnation, temporary holds, recall, penalties for violations 
of food safety laws, whistle-blower protection, and civil actions are all components of a 
food safety system that would have some teeth. 
On the issue of reorganizing, streamlining, and modernizing the food and 
agricultural system, the legislation would have the same budgeting issues from a different 
perspective and an added dimension of organizational realignment, but once over the 
initial hurdles, could actually provide a more directed focus to the issues of enhanced 
food safety and the new culture of food defense. 
The Safe Food Act calls for a complete revamping of the current food 
safety regulatory system. It provides the U.S. legislation already in Congress for 
consideration of a legislative proposal for a system that can be used to provide oversight 
of the entire food supply chain. The move toward a single oversight food safety system 




regulatory system has been expanding rapidly and moving away from the concept of a 
single oversight agency. The Safe Food Act has potential and is relevant to the 
conceptual model that will be introduced in the next chapter. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
1. A Guiding “Act” for Change 
A move toward a single food safety agency will need a beginning process to 
strengthen the idea. The Food Safety Authority Modernization Act, Senate Bill S. 2245, 
would be a positive place to start. The bill would provide an opportunity for all 
stakeholders in the current U.S. food safety system to come together and discuss 
modernization of the food regulatory system. 
Food Safety Authority Modernization Act [S.2245.IS] (U.S. Library of 
Congress, Thomas Home, 2008a)15 (read twice and referred to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs) 
A synopsis of the proposed bill is below. The bill would begin an in-depth 
investigation to enable the nation to move positively toward a single oversight agency. 
• Establish a Congressional Bipartisan Food Safety Commission to: 
• Review the U.S. food safety system and relevant statutes, studies, 
and reports; 
• Prepare a report that summarizes information about the current 
system, makes specified recommendations (including ways to 
modernize the system, improve coordination of food safety 
activities, emphasize preventive strategies, and provide funding 
mechanisms to federal agencies to carry out food safety 
responsibilities); and 
• Draft statutory language that would implement the 
recommendations. 
                                                 
15 This bill was proposed in the 110th session of Congress. Sessions of Congress last two years, and at 
the end of each session all proposed bills and resolutions that have not passed are cleared from the books. 
The 110th Congress is about to end (2007–2008). Members often reintroduce bills that did not come up for 
debate under a new number in the next session. The 111th Congress begins in 2009 and the bill will most 
likely be reintroduced. 
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• Additionally, the bill directs the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to provide the Commission with specified 
funding and support services. It would also terminate budget authority to 
implement food and food safety provisions of the Poultry Products 
Inspection Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Egg Products 
Inspection Act, and Chapters I through IV of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act two years after its enactment. These last two items would 
depend on the findings and consolidation of a bill coming out from the 
Commission’s recommendations and its enactment it the form of a 
legislative act. 
Analysis shows the specific Food Safety Authority Modernization Act to be a 
process that may help to gain bipartisan support and stakeholder support for the proposed 
Safe Food Act. It would provide for a detailed forum to discuss and strengthen support 
for enhancement of food safety toward a modernized food safety structure and harmonize 
statutes (U.S. Library of Congress, 2008a). Any significant change to modernize the food 
safety regulatory structure will require the support of all stakeholders. At the top level, it 
will take the support and action of the legislative and executive branches of our 
government. Until there is consensus and the votes necessary for what most agree is the 
best practice to provide citizens with a collective system that covers requirements for 
protection of the food supply at all levels and under one agency, modernization of the 
regulatory system could stall. 
 
 91
VII. A REALISTIC CONCEPT—A CONSOLIDATED FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT ADMINISTRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION—CAN THE FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY SYSTEM 
BE CONSOLIDATED? 
Any move toward consolidation of the food safety regulatory system will take 
strong leadership. Some resistance to change evolves from unease at the thought of 
removal from familiar turf and an atmosphere of lost control and comfort zone. Steven 
Kelman (2005), in his book, Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in 
Government, wrote, “Resistance to change originating in a worry that change will upset 
power relationships is an organizationally created example of how existing practice 
becomes embedded in something larger” (p. 25). A change in regulatory structure by 
government leadership may be perceived also as a lack of confidence and trust in the 
current system and leadership ideals and vision. 
1. Consolidation Challenges Met 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany embraced the challenge to improve 
their food and agricultural safety systems through consolidation of the various agencies 
that had been protecting the food/agricultural supply. The United Kingdom and Germany 
embraced a single food safety regulatory system change based on a necessity to control 
disease events occurring in the food supply (food-use animals) and human and animal-
related illnesses. Others based their regulatory system change on concerns about potential 
negative economic impacts borne out of trade restrictions placed on food products by 
other countries. In all three countries, there was concern that importing countries in the 
European Union (trading partners) would not allow the former’s food and agricultural 
products to be exported into other countries, if the country did not consolidate their food 
safety regulatory program toward a shared vision of efficiency and proactive 
commonality in food protection regulatory structure. 
These concerns were based on how the country was focusing their protection 
efforts on their nation’s food supply chain outward toward the regional and global 
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community. In each of the three countries, the negative impact on their national 
economies from ignoring both concerns would be detrimental to the countries affected by 
trade restrictions. All three countries, however, were equally aware of one of the most 
important problems they faced—the concerns of their own citizens about the protection 
of the food/agricultural supply and the need for greater transparency and knowledge of 
what was actually being done. 
There are more examples in the literature about democratic countries around the 
world creating a single or more focused food safety system.16 All of these countries also 
made the commitment to follow a new direction and create a shift in culture or a “Blue 
Ocean Strategy” on how a single (more focused) food safety system should look, and 
then made it a reality. A Blue Ocean Strategy, as described by Kim and Mauborgne 
(2005) in their book of the same name, is a strategy when existing boundaries and 
limitations are transcended to create a new culture or the creation of innovative value to 
unlock new demand. With recent concerns over the increases in the number of food-
related illnesses and contaminations in almost every food product category, shouldn’t the 
United States embrace the same strategy change and the same positive outlook for 
improvement of the regulatory system? A serious deliberation of such a shift in 
regulatory structure, with a focused effort toward combined food safety and defense, is 
especially important if progressive food protection is to become a reality. 
2. Changes Proposed 
Chapter VI analysis shows the efforts of various individuals and groups through 
proposed legislation to meet the challenge and create some type of a new focused food 
safety regulatory system that moves away from the multiple system approach we have 
been using in the United States. Analysis showed that while good quality legislation is 
being considered, it has yet to make it out of the initial committees in which the 
legislation was placed for deliberation. The policy of a more focused and single (smaller) 
food safety regulatory agency is definitely one that needs to be considered as we face the 
possible challenges of the food/agriculture infrastructure being used for intentional 
                                                 
16 For example, GAO-08-794 examined also New Zealand, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands. 
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contamination by terrorist organizations. We should always remember the lessons of 9/11 
and take nothing for granted. A more focused food safety regulatory system can meet that 
threat and create an infrastructure that is both resilient and defendable. 
While specific food and agricultural legislative proposals, as addressed in Chapter 
VI, have the best chance for success, there appears to be a complex reluctance to move 
ahead with the legislation. Steven Kelman (2005) also wrote in his book, Unleashing 
Change, that “Behavior in government organizations is harder to change than in other 
organizations—and bureaucratic organization in government is particularly resistant to 
change” (p. 28). In essence, there is a delaying tactic by affected organizations and 
internal leaders within government organizations to slow down any change proposals and 
the process for change itself.  
The above perspective can create a hope among those opposed to change in the 
current regulatory food safety system that congressional leaders, and advocates for food 
safety restructuring in the United States, will shift attention from the issue and amble on 
to something else and that “this too shall pass” (Kelman, 2005, p. 28). So far, the 
perspective appears to have followed these traits. Some believe that if they resist long 
enough, the idea for change will go away. The frequent occurrence of the same 
legislation described in the latter portion of Chapter VI for change in the structure of the 
food safety regulatory structure, having moved from the 109th to the 110th congressional 
legislative sessions without any action at all, is direct evidence of the “this too shall pass” 
mentality. The legislation will now have to be reintroduced into the upcoming 111th 
congressional session. What will it take to move toward a single food safety oversight 
administration in the United States? Will the current workable legislative proposals 
continue to stall in Congress and be ignored? Or, will additional legislation be proposed 
to further confuse the system and muddle any chance for appropriate improvement of the 
regulatory system? Where do we go from here? 
3. The Move Forward to a New Concept 
Others have proven that food regulatory systems can be consolidated to improve 
the process, and we have legislative proposals in the pipeline here in the United States to 
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move forward toward a similar system. While democratic government legislative 
processes will always be complex, the impetus needed for change may be as simple as a 
strategic concept blueprint of what a single food safety and defense regulatory oversight 
administration might resemble in structural appearance. This chapter will present a 
visualization of strategic concepts. The conceptual designs will be used to stimulate the 
thought process of how innovative value can be created to break the mold of inefficiency, 
and ineffective use of resources from multiple statutes, duplication of mission, and 
confusion of who is in charge of what food commodity. The strategy will also be a shift 
away from the old “Red Ocean Strategy” used by each entity that makes up the U.S. food 
safety regulatory system where they unwittingly vie against one another for the same 
resources in their roles as protectors of the food supply (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). 
The regulatory niches created by numerous statutes and rules that each of these 
agencies have operated under for over a century creates a protective culture against any 
change, whether positive or not, to rejuvenate and strengthen regulated food and 
agricultural safety (Kelman, 2005, p. 28). This chapter presents the author’s strategic 
concept of what a new food safety/defense system framework could look like. It takes the 
road less traveled in its exploration of the innovative value of a consolidated regulatory 
system. It is an attempt to break the pattern of the separate, but similar organizations that 
exist today. The concepts presented in this chapter are also based on the author’s 
confidence, from both research and experience, that a focused food safety and regulatory 
structure is the best way to meet the challenge of future food and agricultural threats and 
to optimize available resources effectively.  
B. A CANVAS TO PORTRAY A STRATEGIC CHANGE 
A portrait of change to a new system for food safety defense/security in the 
United States can begin with the creation of a strategy canvas, which visually compares 
the move from the current system to a new system. A strategy canvas is defined by W. 
Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne (2005) as an analytic framework, both diagnostic and 
action oriented, to build and describe a visual blue ocean strategy for change (p. 25). Kim 
and Mauborgne explained that a strategy canvas has two purposes. First, it helps explain 
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the current system’s place in the sector matrix, allowing us to understand competition 
factors and current investment strategies. Second, it can drive us to act on innovation that 
can rearrange our focus toward alternatives and away from competition, which creates a 
stand-still environment contradictory to growth and change. 
1. The Elements of Change: The Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid 
Creation of a strategy canvas allows for observation of the big picture of what the 
current system is and what something new can offer. Kim and Mauborgne (2005) 
provided supplementary tools that are also supportive in creating the strategy canvas. One 
is called the Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create (ERRC) Grid. The use of an ERRC grid in 
analyzing the change to the food safety regulatory system from multiple agencies to a 
single food safety oversight administration concept allows a move forward, which is 
needed to scrutinize the current system and consider the following. 
• What factors should be eliminated 
• What factors would be reduced 
• What issues would need to be raised 
• What factors should be created to add value to a new food safety 
regulatory structure 
Table 1 shows the results of my analysis of these factors of what are some of the 







Table 1.   Food Safety System ERRC Grid (From: Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
2. The Strategy Canvas for Value Movement to a New Food Safety 
Regulatory System 
The strategy canvas for movement away from the current food safety regulatory 
system toward a streamlined single food safety agency is presented in Figure 8 using 
some of the factors observed in the ERRC grid. The objective of the strategy canvas is to 
provide a picture to analyze the value of movement away from the standard way of doing 
business. For the food safety regulatory reconstruction strategy proposed in this thesis, 
the canvas provides a visual representation of the value innovation that can come from 
consideration and exploration of a new streamlined system. It also shows a 
reconstructionist view of strategy. Built on the theory of internal development, Kim and 
Mauborgne explain this view as one which “proposes that such a change process of 
creation can occur in any organization at any time by the cognitive reconstruction of 
existing data and elements in a fundamentally new way” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 
210). What this implies in the movement toward a single food safety oversight system is 
that change can come without tremendous impact, and with a proper reallocation of 
existing knowledge and resources. The greatest challenge is to convince those affected by 




Figure 8.   Food Safety and Defense Strategy Canvas (From: Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
The strategy canvas presents a picture of how the current system and the proposed 
system differ. It also shows the value proposition that can be associated with the 
proposed new system through a collective food and agricultural food safety system. The 
new single oversight agency should increase consumer confidence, create an environment 
in which those in the food/agricultural industry know what is expected at any given time 
from a regulatory focus, and provide consistency in risk analysis across all spectrums of 
food protection, defense, and even global food security. The next step in the process is to 
provide a visual tour of how the author envisions a singularly focused food safety 
oversight agency and its strategic value. 
C. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL OVERSIGHT ADMINISTRATION 
New legislation will be necessary for the reduction and elimination of current 
statutes on food safety to guide the new food safety oversight administration. The first 
task during the formation of the new oversight agency is the streamlining and reduction 
of statutes that duplicate and complicate the change to a single agency for food protection 
oversight. The enactment of new guiding statutes for the new singular regulatory 
oversight would require detailed analysis. The Food Safety Authority Modernization Act 
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(U.S. Library of Congress, Thomas Home, 2008a) is focused on accomplishment of such 
a task. If passed, the act would establish a mechanism to evaluate all of the ideas for 
change that have been discussed by government, private, and academic think tanks over 
the past several years and to analyze the 35 laws now in use and the legislative proposals 
introduced in the latest session of Congress. 
The passage of the Food Safety Authority Modernization Act would be a valuable 
innovation to prepare the nation for guiding legislation on actual workable statute(s). A 
movement toward creation of new food safety statutes for the oversight agency and 
elimination of the current multiple statutes for the protection of food commodities would, 
in effect, set the path for concentrated focus on the singular concept change to food safety 
in the United States. Figure 9 provides a look at the authors’ visual image of a proposed 
new food safety and defense oversight agency. The image is followed throughout the next 
section of this chapter with brief descriptions that provide a visual and written 
presentation tour of the structure of the new administration. 
 
Figure 9.   Food Safety Oversight Administration Pyramid 
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1. Organizational Structure 
The pyramid structure used to convey the concept of the new food safety and 
defense oversight agency is meant to convey a visualization of a system built with 
foundational strength. The view is for a federal system that covers all aspects of food and 
agricultural safety without division among multiple agencies. The administration 
developed is one that will be transparent, where all stakeholders will see value and know 
that they will be a part of a focused system. There will be room for growth and 
improvement along the way, provided by an administration established from the ground 
up, where the voice and sounding of food safety for the first time in over a century will 
come from a focused entity. The structure as presented may appear to be general in 
nature, but it is provided to present my concept from an uncomplicated strategic view.  
We will examine each tier of the new administration beginning at the top with the 
administrator (secretary). The concept is for the new food safety and defense oversight 
body to be located in the executive branch of government for the new system to be 
effective. The question whether the new body will be a cabinet level position or an 
independent agency, similar in example to the Environmental Protection Agency, is left 
for the leadership to wisely answer, but either way, hopefully, in the near future. The 
importance, however, is that the new oversight body has the support from both the 
executive and legislative branches of the United States, and by rule of law, the 
constitutional backing of the judicial branch. The formation of any new system will 
depend on a concerted effort by all parties for success. 
2. Administrator (Secretary) 
At the tip of the agency pyramid is the position of the administrator (or secretary) 
of food safety and defense oversight. The duties of the new administrator (secretary) will 
be true to the definition of both; that is—”an officer of the state that superintends a 
government administrative department; and one that executes management of their duties 
for the new agency” (Merriam-Webster, 2008a).  
 100
The focus of the single food safety agency away from the multiple agency system 
will require the person who occupies the position to be well-rounded in their 
understanding of the principles of food safety and administration of food safety 
programs. Unfortunately, the process of selection of individuals at this level tends to be 
political. The old saying that “you can’t take the politics out of politics” generally holds 
true. However, it is hoped that the person chosen for the administrator position will be 
selected based on their experience and knowledge of food safety. There is a tendency, 
even in the current multiple food safety system, to select candidates based on a medical 
degree or a doctor of philosophy degree, with little background in the workings of food 
safety from the environmental and grass roots regulatory level. Advanced degrees add to 
an individual’s body of knowledge, but experience specific to food safety and regulation 
should be a major consideration for appointments. 
To safeguard the new system from too much emphasis on politics in the selection 
of an administrator within the framework at the top tier level of the agency, I propose in 
the conceptual framework that there be two deputy level positions. One deputy 
administrator can be appointed by the administrator, but should be required to be well 
versed in his or her knowledge of food safety. The second deputy will be chosen from the 
career ladder within the food safety regulatory system based on their previous 
performance and skill levels. A candidate for this position should be selected from the 
food safety regulatory community, with respected credentials and leadership skills, and 
experience in food safety over their career. 
The requirements for selection, hopefully, should provide balance across the 
political and non-political spectrum from the outset, and present a well-rounded meta-
leadership team focused on food safety and not on politics as usual. Figure 10 presents an 
image of the top tier (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2005). The administrator should also 
be receptive to communication channels throughout the tier system to provide 
transparency of the regulatory system. This communication aspect is an important 
component of the new regulatory system. The next tier level continues the overarching 
theme of communication with the liaison office tier. 
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Figure 10.   Food Safety and Defense Administrator 
3. Liaison Office 
The second tier on the agency pyramid would be the liaison component of the 
agency structure. Liaison is defined as “communication for establishing and maintaining 
mutual understanding and cooperation” (Merriam-Webster, 2008c). The Liaison Office 
would establish and maintain communication with both the outside and inside worlds of 
food safety/defense. The five liaison positions would be the consumer and consumer 
group, industry, state and local, congressional, and homeland security components. 
The liaison positions in the new food safety oversight agency are the 
communication conduit for information flow on food safety/defense, both outside and 
inside the agency. Communication of risk and transparent information exchanges are 
vitally important to success. In the comparisons made in Chapter V, established 
principles required for effective information sharing included the idea of being 
transparent in communicating risk. Two ways that the Merriam-Webster dictionary 
(2008b) defines communication are “1) a technique for expressing ideas effectively; and 
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2) a process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common 
system of symbols, signs, and behavior.” The liaison tier in the food safety administration 
is broken down as follows. 
a. Congressional Liaison 
• Directs communication to members and committees in Congress 
• Provides presence for congressional issues on food safety and food 
defense/security questions 
• Monitors legislation – both positive and negative to maintain the stability 
of the new food safety administration mission 
• Champions agency position for fiscally responsible food safety resource 
requirements 
b. Homeland Security Liaison to DHS 
• Directs communication channel to DHS on issues affecting food and 
agricultural threats across the food supply chain 
• Liaisons, along with food defense, intelligence, and law enforcement 
offices in the food oversight agency, to foreign governments regarding 
threats to the global food supply 
• Responsible for communication to other agency liaisons in line with 
HSPD-9 to share information of threats to the food supply 
c. Consumer Liaison 
• Directs communication channel to consumers and consumer groups 
(consumer response will require technology bridges to be built to address 
concerns) on situational awareness 
• Communicates concerns, questions, and answers for specific issues 
throughout agency departments from consumers and consumer groups 
• Directs access to administrator level to communicate high level concerns 





d. State and Local Liaison 
• Directs communication channels to state and local regulatory agencies in 
all 50 states and territories. (While the state and local affairs office will 
also have a role in this communication, this will allow the administration 
to have direct access to state and local concerns) 
• Advocates for state and local concerns by effect of federal mandates 
e. Industry Liaison 
• Directs communication channels for industry to regulatory on primary 
issues affecting the agricultural and food safety oversight of industry 
(industry can offer information on innovative processes) 
• Communicates to other liaison positions on issues and information that 
industry may provide on issues of food security and regulatory concerns. 
(The linkage of communication between the consumer and consumer 
group liaison is also critical to the success of maintaining transparency and 
eliminating the appearance of industry favoritism. The net benefit, 
however, is that industry can provide valuable information to the success 
of the regulatory mission as an integral stakeholder in the overall 
protection of the food supply) 
4. Risk Offices 
While all tier offices in the administration would be important to establish a 
singular mission involving food safety and defense, the risk offices will occupy an 
important role in risk analysis (risk assessment, risk management, risk communication) of 
all food commodities. The research and finding that will come out of the risk offices will 
establish three primary items of importance on every food and agricultural community 
and the biological, chemical, radiological, and physical hazards associated with it. The 
three primary duties will be to provide information in a combined risk analysis of food 
and agriculture through the following. 
• The assessment and identification of risk and hazards associated with all 
foods processed and unprocessed 
• The management of all foods after risks are identified through 
development and use of appropriate codes, standards, and regulations as 
guidance to regulatory actions (preferably proactive and not reactive) 
• The communication of risk to avoid lack of situational awareness 
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The separation of risk offices into a risk assessment office and a risk management 
office is purposeful. While there will be constant communication to achieve better 
transparency and awareness, the comparative analysis in Chapter V showed that there 
was concern among consumers in the countries analyzed for an open assessment of risk 
separate from risk management. The concern stemmed around the idea of government 
favoritism toward industry in promoting, for example, agricultural products for export. 
The concern grew from the idea that a direct link between an entity performing the 
assessment of risk and then also being responsible for direct management of risk 
(creation of standards, and regulations) would favor economic growth of the industry 
over protection of the consumer. While the conceptual model of a single oversight agency 
may seem to be a contradiction to achieving this separation, a division of roles between 
the two offices can be established to maintain transparency. 
a. Risk Assessment Office 
The risk assessment office will use science and knowledge of food and 
pathogens for the responsibilities of the following. 
• Hazard identification 
• Hazard classification 
• Exposure assessment 
• Risk categorization (Foodrisk.org, 2008) 
The World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) (2004) in the Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual, 
Fourteenth Edition defines risk assessment as “a scientifically based process consisting of 
the following steps: (i) hazard identification, (ii) hazard characterization, (iii) exposure 
assessment, and (iv) risk characterization.” 
The risk assessment office would also serve as an outreach conduit for 
science, research, and risk analysis from the academic and private research done on food 
and agricultural processes. Information gathered via collaborative research can be tested 
to confirm risks, but the type of risk assessment information that can be provided through 
sharing information and research is immeasurable. This transparency of data across the 
 105
stakeholder sector specific to risks and hazards associated with food can be used to 
mitigate problems and create an atmosphere of trust by all stakeholders in food 
safety/defense initiatives. 
b. Risk Management Office 
The risk management office will use the information from the research 
performed by the risk assessment office to do the following. 
• Develop statutes, standards, codes and regulations based on the assessed 
risks to the following 
• Reduce the impact of the risk 
• Reduce the likelihood of the risk 
• Develop trade-offs of available options (for example, time temperature 
relationships using science and knowledge to manage risk) (Foodrisk.org, 
2008) 
• Apply the best practices to address risk (for example, the use of 
Precautionary measures until further risk assessment can be completed for 
unknowns) 
The WHO/FAO in the Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural 
Manual, Fourteenth Edition (2004), defines risk management as “The process, distinct 
from risk assessment, of weighing policy alternatives, in consultation with all interested 
parties, considering risk assessment and other factors relevant for the health protection of 
consumers and for the promotion of fair trade practices, and, if needed, selecting 
appropriate prevention and control options.”17 
The risk management office in a singular oversight agency would focus on 
reduction of multiple regulation, codes, and standards that have added to the confusion of 
regulatory oversight under the current system. For example, if three current regulations  
 
 
                                                 
17 The only sticking factor in the definition of risk management from WHO/FAO is the possible 
favoritism and non-transparency created with the definition component, “for the promotion of fair trade 
practices.” Risk management should focus on the risks and hazards for the protection of the health of the 
consumer and not on industry economics. 
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that were created by different statutes and mandates based on the same risk can be 
reduced to one, the benefit is immediately apparent from the cost savings from 
production of multiple documents alone. 
c. Risk Communication 
The WHO/FAO in Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual 
(2004) defines risk communication as “The interactive exchange of information and 
opinions throughout the risk analysis process concerning risk, risk-related factors and risk 
perceptions, among risk assessors, risk managers, consumers, industry, the academic 
community and other interested parties, including the explanation of risk assessment 
findings and the basis of risk management decisions.” 
Figure 11 depicts the importance of the risk offices and risk analysis as 
part of a continuous and circular process that will add value to protection of the food 
supply if the concept of the single food safety regulatory oversight is embraced. 
 
Figure 11.   Risk Offices Separate but Interlinked under the Food Safety Oversight 
Umbrella 
5. Food and Agriculture Safety/Defense Offices 
The consolidation of all food safety activities under a single agency umbrella will 
have benefits not only in increased standardization of the food safety system across all 
food commodities, but also in the increase the resources available to perform inspections 
of food at all levels, and should send a message of unity and consistency to consumers  
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and the industry. A clearer picture of a once larger-than-life maze of food regulatory 
agencies and standards should send a message of uniformity that has never been 
established across the U.S. food regulatory community. 
a. Food Safety Office 
The significance of a newly unified food safety office would be its charge 
to regulate, at the interstate and federal levels, the processing and preparation of all food 
commodities across the food supply chain, from farm to market. The revamping of 
antiquated statutes with the implementation of 21st century statutes that encompass 
proactive regulatory change can provide the consistency and a more definitive approach 
that food safety needs to keep up with increases in the size of the food supply chain. With 
the consolidation of the multiple food safety agencies and the reduction of statutes that 
are now being duplicated by multiple agencies with different standards, methods, and 
mandates, the food safety office and its personnel would be standardized across all food 
commodities. 
With fewer but better-defined statutes and the consistency of inspection 
management tools, a baseline by the food safety office could now be established to 
monitor effectiveness of food safety inspections, basing frequency on risk factors. This 
will allow increased frequency of visits to facilities that may have fallen through the gaps 
because of limited resource factors and allow more flexibility in priorities associated with 
tracking sources of foodborne illnesses. 
With consolidated resources, the food safety office could also be able to 
focus more resource and time on imported foods. Once again, the limits placed on 
inspections of imports based on multiple agencies would no longer be an issue. More 
time could also be placed on statutory change that should incorporate a certification 
system for foreign governments or food establishments wanting to import foods into the 
United States. Working with the agency liaison office and its protocols, the food safety 
office could also establish properly negotiated trade agreements with the industry and 
other parts of the U.S. government, with food safety as a top priority. Countries wishing 
to import into the United States would have to meet a standard format of requirements 
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and agreements through a single agency. Instead of working through several agencies 
with differing standards and protocols, there would be a straightforward and less 
confusing coordination of process. 
As previously mentioned, a major component would be the establishment 
of trace-back and recall authority from point of origin to retail sale. The office of food 
safety, regardless of the commodity, would establish a protocol that can call on all 
resources available to manage the recall or trace back responsibly and correspondingly. 
This component alone is a large part of the recent sluggishness during the last few years 
to identify sources and food vectors of contamination in national outbreaks. Point-of-
origin requirements would provide the food safety office with the ability to halt products 
responsible for contamination more quickly, even if only ingredient components of 
processed food products are implicated. 
b. Food Defense Office 
The food defense office would have responsibility over evaluating the 
readiness of the food/agricultural industry from a physical infrastructure, preparedness, 
and situational awareness perspective in reference to the possibility of intentional 
contamination of the food supply. There are concerns that in most cases it is hard to 
determine, from among the more than 250 foodborne diseases caused by a variety of 
bacteria, viruses, parasites, and toxins that can be associated with foodborne illnesses, 
whether a food contamination was unintentional or intentional (U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control, 2005). In harmony with the purpose of overall food protection and security, the 
food safety and defense offices are interlinked with each other. The food defense office 
would closely coordinate with the food safety office on standardization of mission, 
understanding that in case of a large unintentional contamination event, such as tornados, 
hurricanes, ice storms, and power failures, that the organizations that produce foods are 
prepared and would require immediate contact for protection of the food supply. The 
same process of food safety and food defense can be coordinated on both sides of the 
framework to work together for a common cause. The current system is not set up to use  
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the combined expertise needed to coordinate efforts, especially with the formation of 
several food defense offices in the various agencies that would be responsible for food 
safety and food defense. 
While the probability of intentional contamination of the food supply is 
thought by some to be low, the fact remains that the food/agricultural infrastructure and 
food supply remain targets of interest for terrorist organizations. A survey by Stinson, 
Kinsey, Degeneffe, and Ghosh, (2007) published in the Homeland Security Journal 
showed a high percentage among U.S. respondents polled (4,260 persons), who said they 
were concerned about the possibility of deliberate contamination of the food supply from 
a terrorist attack. Table 2 shows some of the data from the survey specific to food. 
 
Respondents Who Said They Were Concerned About Deliberate 








Allocation of Funds 
for Target Type – 
Food and 
Agriculture         
Allocation of 
Funds If Post-
Scenario Event     
 77 percent  44 percent  19.3 percent 
 (Ranked Highest) 
 
 22.88 percent 
(Ranked Highest) 
Table 2.   National Survey of Attitudes of Terrorism (From: Stinson et al., 2007)  
Preliminary results of a survey about perceptions that Americans have 
toward homeland security conducted by Stanford University and NPS/CHDS professor 
Jim Breckenridge (Breckenridge, personal communication, 2008), of 400 polled 
individuals, showed that 23.2 percent of the respondents polled saw contaminated food 
problems as a matter of great concern. The concern about protection of the food supply 
ranked third on a list of homeland security concerns that Dr. Breckenridge presented in 
the survey related to fears of attack by terrorists. These data provide evidence that the 
U.S. public will support the use of resources in the interlinked food safety and food 
defense offices within the framework. Food defense has been defined as “a collective  
 
 110
term to encompass activities associated with protecting the nation's food supply from 
deliberate or intentional acts of contamination or tampering. This term encompasses other 
similar verbiage (i.e., bioterrorism, counter-terrorism, etc.) (FDA, 2008).”  
6. Education and Awareness Office 
With the many incidents of food-related illnesses in the last few years, the 
significance of education cannot be overemphasized. Awareness of the vulnerabilities 
and causes of food-related illnesses, in even general terms, can create a platform for 
growth of positive understanding of the nature of food and agricultural contaminants. 
Also, awareness provides a cadre of citizens who can be the extra eyes and ears that can 
help to protect the food supply from intentional contamination. Learning to recognize 
incidents and abnormal activities could have a positive affect on food safety/defense at all 
levels of the food supply chain. As knowledgeable consumers, citizens will know what to 
do to protect their health if natural disasters occur by knowing when foods could be a 
hazard and which foods are safe. 
The education and awareness office would interlink with the other tier levels in 
the agency to promote a culture of innovative training and an educational opportunity to 
improve information sharing, both vertically and horizontally. The staffing and tools 
developed by the education and awareness office would be designed to take advantage of 
the latest techniques and technologies to enhance knowledge. 
The education and awareness office would develop and deliver tools to do the 
following. 
• Provide and communicate information on foodborne illness prevention 
strategies that is consistent, timely, and up to date 
• Create technological learning portals for consumers, state and local 
regulatory employees (including law enforcement and first responders), 
and industry for assessment of their food safety and defense knowledge; 
create an interactive learning environment for a food safety/defense 
culture that is proactive and response driven (web sites, social networking 
system similar to Twitter, Facebook) 
• Create a “take it on the road” campaign for all 50 states and territories on 
food safety education coordinated with state and local regulatory officials 
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• Provide staff in all 50 states that can help create food safety educational 
programs within their regulatory, industry, consumer, and academic 
communities. This will help establish consistent and collective education 
instead of separate conflicting education on food safety information. 
Again, this would bring proactive prevention through learning. 
• Elevate food safety through use and partnership with the media throughout 
the country. This will help develop a consistent message through 
collaborative efforts. 
• Create a system based on technology to monitor education and training 
efforts to create a database of learners and trainers who can monitor 
success of food safety and education across all stakeholder spectrums 
The education and awareness office could create a new culture of food 
safety/defense in the United States. The old culture of selective education about food 
safety, based on budgets and selective grants only used by a few organizations affiliated 
with primary agencies, including the DHS Office of Health, would be a non-issue in the 
new agency. All funding and food educational efforts could be coordinated through the 
new agency office and with the interlinking system through the liaison office and other 
offices in the new structure to other agencies such as DHS for food defense studies.  
7. Epidemiology and Surveillance Office 
A new oversight agency office set up only for the purpose of food-related illness 
surveillance and epidemiology could provide a system of consistent and non-distracted 
focus on foodborne illness alone and a budget allocation to match. Interaction with state 
laboratories for testing, state and local food protection programs for investigation 
response, and surveillance for food-related problem patterns could be expanded. A 
dedicated office with sufficient budget and resource allocation to improve monitoring, 
surveillance, and epidemiologic capacity to assist federal, state, and local partners would 
address the national goal of reduction of foodborne illnesses. This should create the data 
necessary to drive a proactive prevention strategy that moves beyond the reactive and 
response-driven after-the-fact situations that often occur. The interaction and connectivity 
to education and awareness, risk assessment, risk management, and liaison offices can 
drive communication of risk and solution emphasis if adjustments need to be made to 
strategy. It would involve one agency rather than many. 
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The epidemiology and surveillance office would focus on the following. 
• Increased connectivity with state and local agencies and their respective 
laboratories to increase data capacity through surveillance and 
epidemiological investigations (Technological bridges, web sites such as 
Twitter and Facebook to share information) 
• Resource and budget allocations to help states and local systems increase 
capacity for surveillance, testing, and epidemiological investigations 
• Standardization of methods that would be consistent throughout the nation 
and a movement away from different methodologies. (The new agency 
would coordinate with state and local agencies to develop a method that is 
productive and workable for all) 
Legislation from Chapter VI under the section heading “Enhancing the Current 
Regulatory System—No Widespread Changes” entitled Food Safety Modernization Act 
[S. 3385] in the 110th Congress actually would, if modified to fit the proposed model, 
assist in increasing surveillance and epidemiology. It would be a good fit as far as 
legislation goes within the functioning of the epidemiology and surveillance office, and 
when considering the process model. 
Identification of the cause of illnesses and vectors associated with food-related 
illness is important to reduce the incidence of foodborne illness outbreaks. Active 
surveillance is important to track the pathogens or chemicals responsible for an illness. 
Surveillance and epidemiologic evidence are important elements to prevent illness, and 
also to identify and stop the disease from spreading once it has started.  
8. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Office 
A single-focus agency would promote a unified approach to law enforcement and 
intelligence in relationship to food commodities. The new focus would allow for direct 
interactions by one agency, rather than several, on issues that involve intentional threats 
or investigation of unintentional contamination of food commodities, to partners in the 
state and local food regulatory community, the law enforcement and responder 
community, and the national law enforcement and intelligence communities. 
The intelligence and law enforcement office in the food safety and defense 
oversight agency construct would do the following. 
 113
• Assist with intelligence gathering specific to food and agricultural 
products as subject matter experts for analysis of threats to the sector 
based on intelligence by 
• Directly interacting with the intelligence and law enforcement 
community, and regulatory community is the state and local offices 
• Providing continuous and coordinated links to subject matter 
experts in the risk assessment, education, and awareness, the 
epidemiologic and surveillance, liaison (communication and 
message delivery) offices, and the coordinating and state field and 
industry affairs community offices. 
• Establish a single conduit for investigation of prohibited acts and penalties 
for food safety laws 
• Assist with the enforcement of provisions established through new statutes 
for administrative detention, holds, and condemnation of food 
commodities 
Enforcement, along with intelligence gathering and analyzing of different aspects 
of food safety data pertinent to the external and internal threat protection, security, and 
defense of food and agriculture, has been eclectic at best. Differing regulations, statutes, 
and codes have limited what has been done in this facet of the new order of food safety. 
Federal, state, and local law enforcement and responder communities are still not fully 
aware of their roles in defense of the food supply from intentional contamination. 
A 2006-research report document reprinted in 2007 issued from the U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Research 
for Policy, entitled Agroterrorism—Why We’re Not Ready: A Look at the Role of Law 
Enforcement touched on only one aspect of the food commodity spectrum. However, it 
touched on an issue that shows the confusion of the law enforcement community about 
what their role in food and agricultural security will be and should be. The report, in its 
conclusion, discussed creation of a coordinated national plan for law enforcement to 
prevent, respond to, and ultimately recover from an incident of agroterrorism (Schmitt, 
2007). The role of law enforcement and intelligence gathers will go beyond agriculture to 
include all food commodities. The 2006 report was a beginning in addressing the 
concerns for law enforcement’s role in food defense. It also brings the issue of food 
security/defense to the forefront, and shows the complications of strategy associated with 
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the law enforcement and intelligence communities and their roles in national security for 
the food/agricultural sector. The creation of a combined intelligence and law enforcement 
office would help bring clarity to this important security role in food protection.  
9. State and Local Affairs Office 
With field offices located in each state and territory, the state and local affairs 
office would have a direct link to the state and local inspection systems that oversee 
protection of most of the food supply that reaches consumers at the retail level. The 
interactive approach creates a linkage, as is the case with regional offices of the FDA and 
USDA that exist separately today, with the state and local offices on interpretation and 
standardization of food safety assessments and approaches to food safety inspections. At 
present, the safety and security of food is divided by agency interaction, retail to FDA, 
and agricultural wholesale tied to USDA and FDA, depending on food commodity type. 
It is often left up to the state retail inspection and agricultural wholesale inspection 
agencies to fill the divide created by federal mandates on commodity types that may fall 
through the gaps. 
The state and local food safety affairs office would do the following. 
• Guide standardization of inspections and statute interpretation, regardless 
of food commodity. Food safety risk factors and sanitation standards 
would be interpreted clearly for each food facility. 
• Create a local link to the federal food safety network in the state-specific 
and dedicated only to food safety. (For example, the current FDA structure 
has limited regional staff dedicated to food safety. FDA consumer safety 
officers assigned to most states may have primary duties in medical device 
safety or other products regulated by FDA) 
• Create a link between the federal food safety affairs office and the state 
and local offices on educational collaboration on education of food safety 
to consumers and the regulatory agencies on new information about food 
safety. This would be part of the collective effort and communication 
channels created up to the educational and awareness office. 
• Provide an additional conduit for concerns that state and local agencies 
have regarding issues not addressed in the food safety system. Innovation 




through smarter practices need to have support along any access point 
within the food safety regulatory system to build true collective solutions 
and collaborative processes. 
The food and agricultural industry office mission would be the focus it places on 
the industry and its delivery of safe food products. The men and women in the field 
would be the consistent link to the industry and its food safety programs of the facilities 
and states in which they are located. The industry affairs office also would act as the 
support and inspection mechanism for areas where ports of entry are located in the United 
States. The port inspections would focus a single agency on all points through which food 
and agricultural imported products enter and exported food products exit. This would also 
be an enhancement of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in food defense with 
an increased presence of food safety and regulatory experts. 
Also improved, similar to the state and local affairs office, would be the 
following. 
• Standardization of inspections in industry processing and production 
plants to include increased or decreased inspection, depending on risk 
analysis. (Any decrease would be dependant on inspection history, 
potential risk or hazard of the food product itself, and the created ability to 
focus on more troubling problem facilities, for example, the peanut 
manufacturing facility responsible for the recent outbreak associated with 
the Georgia manufacturing plant) 
• Increased education on food safety to industry, in conjunction with the 
food safety and defense education of the industry of each facility 
• Increased inspection, assistance, and consistency with industry facilities in 
improvement of food defense plans 
• In trace-back situations in foodborne illness outbreaks, working directly 
with food manufacturing plants in each state on evaluation of product, to 
eliminate or link like products and ingredients, to specific outbreak 
information. (Proactive response, instead of a reactive response, would 
also build trust of information sharing when contaminants found are not 
intentional.) 
In times of crisis in a national outbreak, the use of staff from both the state and 
local affairs and industry affairs offices, which would be a shared location, could 
establish a cadre of staff that could be quickly combined for identifying food-related  
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contaminants. The relationships established with the state and local regulatory food safety 
systems could also lead to regular contact among the state, local, and federal regulatory 
system.  
D. CONCLUSION 
1. The Agency for Food and Agricultural Specific Oversight 
A new food safety and defense oversight agency could establish a unified system 
that encourages replication of the system at the state and local levels. Replication of the 
new federal system would assist in a complete merger of the food safety regulatory 
system in the United States into a collective food safety culture. The mission of a single 
food safety and defense oversight system at the federal agency should lead to this unity of 
operation. A complementary food safety regulatory system at all levels—federal, state, 
and local—would enhance communication and create balance. Food safety codes, 
regulations, and inspections based on the same system would lead to consistency and 
streamlining and provide order to the complexity associated with multiple bureaucracies. 
The new federal system would require innovative leadership and employees, each 
with a stake in the new concept’s success. Regulations and standards at the federal level 
would require straightforward wording to avoid the complexities that often occur in the 
current system when regulations and code standards are forwarded to the states for 
consideration and adoption. The conceptual design framework presented in this chapter 
hopefully will stimulate the ideas of those with the power to produce the mechanism for 
innovative movement to see such a change occur. The advancement of food safety will 
never see its full potential unless a move to a single voice for food safety and security is 
formed. The concept framework presented would once again bring the United States 
forward as a society with a tradition of being innovative, progressive, and a world leader.  
2. Why Should We Move Forward? 
As stated in the book MegaCommunities, by Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and 
Kelly (2008), the concept of working together as a network is not to detract from the 
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individual, but to add strength to the collective when challenges need a larger set of 
resources and skills to solve problems that face the greater community. A move to a 
single agency would be a positive step toward building a megacommunity within a 
unified framework where the collective minds and skills of those dedicated to the food 
safety workforce could truly help and learn from one another. 
All are charged, including the industry and academic research components of the 
infrastructure, in preventing illnesses and preparing for both the unintentional and 
possible deliberate attacks on our food and water supplies, and protecting our citizenry 
from harm. A unified system can be described as a smart practice. With that in mind, 
Eugene Bardach (2006) describes a “smart practice” as a practice that takes advantage of 
some latent potential in nature to achieve a goal at relatively low cost (pp. 28–47). The 
strategy of multiple organizations or agencies converted to a single agency for oversight 
of food safety exposes the latent potential for better collaboration and efficiency. It also 
creates an internal mechanism focused and coordinated towards food safety and smarter 
information sharing and food protection activity on a new level. A single agency can 
create this culture. The potentially lower cost of such a process makes it a smart practice 
because it allows redundancy among individual agency systems to be eliminated, at all 
times, but especially during national food-related illness outbreaks when coordinated 
efforts are needed to manage and respond to threats. 
Bardach explains that an “interesting idea” in a practice is also considered a 
“smart practice.” He prefers the term “smart practice” to “best practice” because any 
practice worth special attention should have something clever about it. It is the clever part 
of the practice that must been analyzed, characterized in words, and appraised as to its 
application to the situation (Bardach, 2005). The idea of a new organizational community 
for handling food safety creates an interesting idea and a clever strategy that merits the 
title “smart practice.” The idea behind such a collaboration strategy identifies a system 
that would provide a single and proactive focus to all aspects of food safety/defense. This 
type of agency culture and the atmosphere created from a concept that is new and 
innovative would allow everyone involved to be on the same page and part of the 
creation of positive change. 
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C. F. Kurtz and D. J. Snowden (2003) in their article on sense-making provide a 
good descriptive lesson on the challenges faced when trying to describe and change 
organizational structures to be more effective. They called their sense-making model the 
Cynefin Framework. The framework consisted of ordered and unordered domains that 
challenged organizations. At present, each agency in the current system with food safety 
responsibilities has its own standard operating procedures (SOPs) within their field of 
expertise. Some of the discipline SOPs are known to work based on predetermined 
practice, while other SOPs are knowable in the sense that expert advice on the data being 
analyzed shows that a new SOP should work (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). There can be an 
underlying sense that what is known or knowable should work in all situations as part of 
the ordered domain, and that a change to a new system would disrupt order in food 
safety. However, in the real world when an outbreak, a disaster, or threat occurs, one 
discipline may not have all the available resources and expertise to perform every 
function needed to handle the situation. In the domain of the unordered where chaos may 
rule the moment, quick, imaginative, and decisive decision-making may be necessary, 
which can be a decision that no one agency at present, based on differing statues alone, 
may be prepared or allowed to make such decisions (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  
Also in the area of the unordered domain, which may play a part in a disaster or 
threat scenario, is the concept of complex relationships. Collaboration among multiple 
agencies can be a complex relationship. In these types of collaborations, there is often a 
feeling that “my way is better than your way,” while in fact, both ways may have merit. 
For example, collaboration especially during a chaotic situation, such as natural disasters 
like a hurricane or a tornado can be complex if the agencies or disciplines involved in 
response and recovery have not already agreed on how they will work together. As Kurt 
and Snowden reported in their studies on sense-making, this is the time to “stand still” 
(but pay attention) and gain new perspective on a situation instead of only relying on 
patterns of experience to determine response (2003). Kurt and Snowden also wrote that 
the domain of the disordered, the central space, is where individuals compete to interpret 
on the basis of their preference for action. While they may agree on the context, they are  
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considering from the four domains, this central area is where there can be contention 
(2003). A central food safety oversight agency will help move the food safety regulatory 
system out of this area of conflict or disorder. 
Each existing agency will have something to contribute to the concept agency in 
building its initial structure. The people who make up the current agency workforce 
would become a part of the new agency. It is important for all to recognize that they will 
be involved in the success of the system as equal collaborators. The system that they 
collaborate to build can provide real examples of how effectively such a system can 
operate and how different disciplines can merge and work together to build better 
relationships and a smarter system. Such an agency can help close the gap in the 
disordered center space on the food safety/defense equivalent of the Cynefin framework; 
or at least, provide a bridge across the area of disorder into all four domains. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. WHERE WE ARE NOW 
An argument of some food safety leaders is that wholesale change is not needed 
under “my watch.” Another argument is that each individual agency was given the 
responsibility for different aspects of the food supply for a statutory reason and therefore 
change is not immediately possible and is not necessary.  
The observation by leaders and agencies is that with minor alterations to existing 
statutes and additional funding, they will be able to keep up with the challenges of 
protecting a food and agricultural food supply chain that has gone global. With consumer 
demand for more food product choices and seasonal fruits and vegetables year round, the 
daunting task of tracking and controlling the flow of food products is constantly growing. 
Protection of the food/agricultural supply and prevention of contamination along the 
global food supply chain is a monumental task that takes tremendous resources and open-
minded leaders committed to a better system. 
The current maze of departments and agencies consists of five executive branch 
departments and agencies, several primary and secondary agencies, and ancillary 
departments and offices under each of these executive branches. Looking back since 
1862, each regulatory body was formed as a reaction to individual crisis and events, 
rather than proactive innovation. Decisions had to be made regarding how to protect food 
commodities in a changing environment. Food product distribution and demand once 
controlled in smaller rural markets were growing into larger urban and national markets. 
Food protection issues on food commodities changed in many ways. For example, 
increased quantities of potentially hazardous food commodities now in the supply chain 
were transported over longer distances to reach market, and there was increased handling 
of food products during processing and distribution.  
The chances for food to be adulterated or become contaminated increased based 
on the variables of time, distance, and handling of products. The probability for increase 
in food-related illnesses created food safety and regulation issues and concerns from 
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citizens. Decisions were made for change in the regulation of food commodities related to 
sanitation and food safety based on what the leaders at the time perhaps deemed as 
necessary to stem the tide of probable increases in foodborne illnesses.  
The policy for improvement in the food safety regulatory structure we see today 
has been forged from reactive responses and concern for the safety of the food supply, the 
citizens, and the vitality of the nation. Leaders and decision-makers have often expressed 
concerns for food safety issues and their effect on consumers and the nation. However, 
their reactions in most part are due to the effect of the outbreaks on the consumers and 
the nation at the moment a food-related outbreak occurs and the generated media 
coverage. However, as new regulations or statutes have been added, each new addition 
sometimes produces more layers of confusion as to how the government goes about 
addressing food safety. The country’s leaders and lawmakers, when pressed to make 
changes, bring about milestones in the history of food safety laws, but no true forward-
thinking change (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2005). However, the present 
regulatory structure and associated statutes to protect the food supply for different food 
commodities are the result of the reactive decisions of past leaders. The history of the 
food safety regulatory structure and the creation of our extensive web of agencies with 
regulatory authority in food safety show how complex a system can become with a purely 
reactive approach to food safety. Underlying all of the negative connotations of change 
are the many reorganizations that would be required, as shown in Chapter VI, if different 
components of various laws were to be passed and enacted into law. Chapter V indicated 
that restructuring a complex system into a more streamlined system is possible without a 
great deal of discourse if the path to change is a focused one. Positive cultural and 
structural change can be accomplished based on the strength of what is thought to be best 
for the country by informed and trusted leaders.  
The possibility of consolidating food safety in the United States and centralizing 
regulatory management programs have been discussed by Presidents and their 




idea because of the maze of differing statutes and laws (Curran, 2003). Consensus about 
what is best for the food safety regulatory system has been difficult to achieve, but 
concern over food safety will continue until a better system is developed. 
B. WHERE WE SHOULD GO 
The overarching intent of this thesis is to stimulate discussion and prompt 
legislative debate toward the creation of a single food safety oversight agency. Based on 
comparisons discussed in this thesis and the conceptual model proposed, a single food 
safety agency with a dedicated and non-bifurcated system has been proposed. A single 
food safety agency would simplify the question of who ensures the safety of which food 
commodity and how those commodities are inspected. If food is imported from other 
countries, information about requirements and who oversees those requirements can be 
acquired without considering the specific ingredients or type of food that is involved. 
Investigations of national food-related illnesses would be handled from a single 
agency with multiple resources available to trace back products and based on authority to 
require product tracking from the farm to the consumer. Research and information about 
threats to the food and agricultural system would be shared through open lines of 
communication and continuing education on biological, chemical, and radiological 
threats and how to manage and prevent threats. Responsibility for protection of the food 
supply is essential and should be required from all stakeholders, farm to table. Everyone, 
federal, state, and local regulators, industry, food science academic and private research 
groups, citizen groups, and citizens themselves, with the proper information should be 
part of enhancing the new system. 
The concept of a single food safety system as presented would involve complex 
discussions, changes in laws, and a consensus among food safety organizations regarding 
effective legislation. The creation of the single food safety oversight agency would 
require intense and dedicated negotiation and commitment. Decision-makers would need 
to work with regulatory leaders at the executive branch and department levels at both the 
federal and state levels so that everyone understands why this change is necessary. These 
decision-makers must rely on valid research and innovative concepts that gather 
superlative information and focus toward the best interest of the nation, in terms of its 
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citizens, national security, and the sustainability of the vital resources within the 
food/agricultural infrastructure. It also requires Congress to establish a focused 
committee structure in both chambers of Congress (Senate and House), perhaps by a 
combined committee dedicated to all food issues. The result would be a more streamlined 
approach to food safety oversight from many committees to only one or two. Bipartisan 
and combined House and Senate committees should be included in these congressional 
committees. There is no reason for multiple committees on food safety/defense. 
Currently, hundred of pieces of legislation are presented during each session of Congress 
on food safety issues. The sheer volume of legislation leads to many pieces of legislation 
that are not acted on because they are lost in the mix of numerous proposals.  
It is important to bring together the best components of the present food safety 
regulatory systems across agencies, to consolidate resources, and create a collective body 
that is under one organized oversight body. This would also help coordination of national 
efforts on food safety threats, whether intentional or unintentional, manmade or natural. 
This should, in theory, lead to a transparent organization that is more efficient while also 
providing accountability for food safety issues that arise. 
Food products can be transported in a day’s time to anywhere in the world. With 
its vast distribution network of growers, producers, processors, suppliers, and consumers, 
the U.S. food sectors are vulnerable to attack at any point in the supply chain. 
The past few years of illness outbreaks related to food products contaminated 
from many sources and different pathogens should be a wake-up call for anyone 
concerned with food safety. Consolidations of food safety systems that have been 
accomplished in other countries give us models of what is possible. It would be a 
disservice to our citizens not to explore the concept of a single food safety agency. 
C. A NEW START—PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
At a strategic level, there must be a starting point. It all could start with 
productive discussions about food safety/defense.  
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1. Baby Steps—A Beginning Through Dialogue 
From the author’s analysis, recommendations include an initial move toward 
passage of the “Food Safety Authority Modernization Act.” Analysis shows this act to be 
part of a process that would be a smart practice in developing ideas toward gaining 
bipartisan and stakeholder support for the proposed Safe Food Act, which is in line with 
the model presented in this thesis. It would provide a forum to discuss and strengthen 
support for all around enhancement of a more modern food safety structure and more 
harmonious statutes. The next step in the process could be to consider the Safe Food Act, 
based on innovation and collaboration garnered from the bipartisan efforts of the Food 
Safety Authority Modernization Act discourse. It is important to build on and enhance 
ideas, as long as the movement is toward consolidation of the regulatory system. The 
author’s recommendations, if acted on by Congress and signed into law by the President, 
it would set the course for modernization of the U.S. food safety system.  
Progress will not take place unless someone steps forward with a plan and has the 
skills needed to form a collaborative structure to build innovative solutions. While an 
agreement to move to a single agency is the focus of the thesis, security of the food 
supply may require an initial first step prior to implementation of new statutes and a new 
agency. The role of the Department of Homeland Security could be part of that first step.  
2. The First Step—Homeland Security and the Food Supply 
The role of the Department of Homeland Security in food defense would be 
enhanced by a single food safety oversight agency, since issues affecting defense would 
be coordinated through this new agency instead of through several branch agencies.  
Pending creation of a new food safety oversight agency, the concern for defense 
of the food infrastructure could find immediate benefit from passage of existing 
legislation in the Burr-Collins Senate Bill entitled, “National Food and Agricultural 
Defense Act.” As described in Chapter VI, this act attempts to fill the gap about how we 
share information. It would create a consolidated national food defense plan for 
protecting our food infrastructure. In the author’s analysis, there should be immediate 
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consideration of this legislation. While it would not create a single food safety agency 
and would maintain the existence of the USDA and the FDA, it would put greater 
emphasis on requiring these agencies to develop a coordinated national plan for food 
emergency preparedness, detection, response, and recovery. The act could also improve 
information sharing at national and state levels and in the public-private sector. Such a 
coordination plan would also be in line with Homeland Security Directive-9. 
3. The Importance of Leadership and Seeing the Big Picture 
Any move toward consolidation of the food safety regulatory system will take 
strong leadership and a desire for improvement. Strong leadership and the desire to 
protect citizens influenced the call for the food safety regulatory changes made in each 
country discussed in Chapter V. It will take a tremendous leadership effort outside the 
usual norms of traditional leadership, from the initial formation of a new food 
safety/defense oversight agency and beyond to create and operate the agency. It may 
demand what Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson (2005) loosely defined as “meta-leadership” 
in their article on national emergency preparedness and government connectivity.  
Meta-leadership is a leadership type that focuses on the overarching “bigger 
picture.” It involves leaders who see the need to cross-organizational lines, to step outside 
of the silos created by individual organizations. These meta-leaders can reach out and 
guide direction to develop a shared common vision, course of action, and focus necessary 
to maintain momentum (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2005). These meta-leaders can be 
found at the highest levels of government, but more significantly, at all stakeholder 
levels. From the fold, innovative, diverse, and critically thinking individuals who are 
needed to move the concept of a new agency forward will come. “Meta-leaders are those 
who encourage people and organizations to extend beyond their traditional scope of 
interest and activity (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2005, p. 46).” Marcus, Dorn, and 





• - courage     - curiosity 
• - imagination     - organizational sensibilities 
• - persuasion     - conflict management 
• - crisis management    - emotional intelligence 
• - persistence and    - leaders who see meta-
leadership as      a valued effort 
in leading the effort to make the situation better for everyone (pp. 48–53). Marcus, Dorn, 
and Henderson say, “the tendency for individual bureaucracies and their leaders to 
promote silo-based objectives and entrepreneurial interests above their mutual 
responsibilities for preparedness must be overcome” (p. 58). All leaders when advocating 
change to a complex system need to encourage collaboration among other leaders. 
4. Time to Move Forward—Creating Positive Change for Resiliency 
Throughout this thesis, we have discussed a move toward a single federal 
oversight food safety agency to look beyond the trepidations and multiple reasons usually 
given for not wanting to streamline the U.S. food safety regulatory system.  
A more resilient national system can be built with the unwavering passion of 
everyone who believes in a vision of enhanced food safety. Chris Bellavita (2005) wrote 
in Changing Homeland Security: The Issue-Attention Cycle, “In the absence of an active 
national consensus that terrorists are a clear and present threat to the lives of average 
Americans, the dynamics of the Issue-Attention Cycle are as inevitable as the seasons” 
(Bellavita, 2005, p. 1). Bellavita based his Issue-Attention Cycle view and the homeland 
security implications on the writings of Anthony Downs. As Bellavita wrote: 
Downs argued that certain issues follow a predictable five stage process: 
pre-problem, alarmed discovery, awareness of the cost of making 
significant progress, gradual decline of intense public interest, and the post 
problem stage. (p. 2) 
In reference to food-related illness outbreaks and calls for improvement in our 
food safety system, we have been, over the last few years, in a perpetual issue-attention 
cycle. We are now and once again somewhere between stages three and five of the issue-
attention cycle. When thinking critically about the positive aspects of change, the 
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tendency is to focus on the negatives and the growing pains that come with change. 
Leaders, stakeholders, and citizens need to focus on what a new system will do for food 
safety in the country, and not on what it will take away from the old system. 
The advocates for change to the system need to build a network of trust among all 
stakeholders. The advocates for change need to show the value in creation of a new 
system and the added value that even those who are opposed would contribute to shaping 
our new system. Consensus leads to a stronger system.  
A focused food safety oversight agency can create an environment of prevention 
out of what William Pelfrey (2005) describes as, a “cycle of preparedness.” Pelfrey, in 
his article, The Cycle of Preparedness: Establishing a Framework to Prepare for 
Terrorist Threats, (2005), used the word “cycle… as a proxy for a dynamic, flexible, and 
continuous process of interaction and integration, and functioning as a self-organizing 
mechanism that improves preparedness for anticipated events and for the unimagined 
events.” He goes on to say that a “…‘cycle’ implies a repetitiveness, in sum as well as in 
parts, that is consistent with ‘preparedness.’ Preparedness cannot be proclaimed or 
finished; it is an ongoing process with constituent parts or phases working in, or being 
available to work in concert” (p. 5). A single food safety oversight agency can benefit 
from Pelfrey’s description of a preparedness cycle. Pelfrey also acknowledges the great 
importance of “prevention” in preparedness, along with awareness, response and 
recovery as part of the four phases of the cycle (p. 4). The challenges for food and 
agricultural safety will continue to weigh toward prevention of food-related illnesses. 
Pelfrey goes on to identify collaboration and information as necessary elements for the 
application of prevention, even to the point of being the most essential parts of prevention 
(p. 7). The proposed change to a single food safety oversight agency and regulatory 
system will consolidate the principles of collaboration and information sharing through 
communication aimed at a smarter focus on prevention and preparedness. 
5. Look Forward and Not Back 
If we fail to provide the best protection to the food infrastructure because of fear 
of criticism, then we may fail to support the survival of our nation. We have continued 
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down the same path for more than 100 years. It is time for a paradigm shift to recreate the 
mold of food and agricultural safety oversight. A single structure formed from the smart 
practices of lessons learned and new ideas will encompass a path of focus, creativity, and 
innovation. Strong and innovative leadership is necessary for success of a new agency. 
a. Strong and Innovative Leadership Required 
Leadership is essential for change. In a complex system change, a single 
leader may not be able to handle all of the needed planning alone. It will take a cadre of 
leaders at all levels initially. John Bryson, in his book, Strategic Planning for Public and 
Nonprofit Organizations (2004), explains a collaborative type of leadership needed in 
strategic planning: 
The tasks of leadership for strategic planning are complex and many. 
Unless the organization is very small, no single person or group can 
perform them all. Effective strategic planning is a collective phenomenon, 
typically involving sponsors, champions, facilitators, teams, task forces, 
and others in various ways at various times. Over the course of a strategy 
change cycle, leaders of many different kinds must put together the 
elements we have described in such a way that organizational 
effectiveness is enhanced – thereby making some important part of the 
world outside of the organization noticeably better. (p. 316) 
Once the new agency is formed, a new type of leadership philosophy 
would be necessary for success. Government organizations have always relied on a 
centralized type of leadership, and this may be hard to change completely in the early 
stages of a new system. However, while a centralized leadership with a single focus on 
food safety would need to be established at the top of the conceptual food safety pyramid 
structure, this author believes that there also needs to be a decentralization of the agency 
structure up and down the pyramid if the system is to be successful. Innovation and ideas 
need to flow from the bottom up to the top also. The creation of a combined system that 
allows communication and the talents of the whole organization will be essential to the 
success of the new agency. Innovative and collaborative leadership will help create a 
forward-reaching organization. 
 130
b. A New and Progressive Type of Organization 
The type of organization the author envisions for the new regulatory 
agency is one that has been identified as a hybrid organization by authors Brafman and 
Beckstrom (2006) in their book, The Starfish and the Spider (2006). The organization is 
one that is a combination of both a centralized and decentralized organization. The hybrid 
organizational approach to the single food safety administration will allow for a flow of 
innovative ideas from within all areas of the agency. This is needed for complete success 
of the proactive concept. The concept will also complement the strengths that will be 
identified from the current regulatory structure that should be kept. The collaborative 
efforts in the new system will be at the heart of an organization that can be innovative 
and new, but melded from the smartest processes of the old system. Brafman’s and 
Beckstrom’s (2006) idea of a hybrid organization, if used in the new agency, will 
combine the bottom-up approach of decentralization and the structure, control, and 
resulting potential of centralization as they describe it, through positive and innovative 
collective efforts. 
Brafman and Beckstrom identify the decentralized portion of a hybrid 
organization as similar to a starfish. The authors explain that if any of the five legs on a 
starfish are removed, a new starfish is created from the removed segment that is able to 
function on its own. However, in a decentralized structure, if the five legs are functioning 
together, the starfish becomes an unstoppable force. They identify the five legs to 
represent (and the author relates these to the new food safety agency) as follows. 
• Leg 1—a circle (All parts of the new food safety agency form a collective 
component of the overall structure, each with the ability to be autonomous 
in their day-to-day activities) 
• Leg 2—the catalyst (All parts of the new food safety agency contribute to 
the success of the whole. Innovation from anywhere in the structure gives 
the spark needed to improve the process, and then transfers back to the 
circle or agency as a whole) 
• Leg 3—ideology (The guiding principle of food safety/defense built on a 
base statute that is strong and supported by all within the agency structure. 
The base of the structural foundation ideology is being proactive, and the 
glue that binds the structure and keeps it strong) 
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• Leg 4—the pre-existing network (The new food safety agency with new 
statutes will be built partly on strengths identified as smart practices of the 
old system) 
• Leg 5—the champion (The new agency needs leadership that is vigilant 
and passionate about the new food safety/defense system. The leadership 
will keep a continuous, non-static, and proactive approach focused on food 
safety/defense. Once a new system is in place, the champion will 
campaign for permanent strength and support for food safety in the United 
States with no divisions to take away from the importance of the 
infrastructure) 
Overall, the new food safety oversight agency should be built on the 
strength of the collective components of people inside and outside the agency.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS—IMPROVED FOOD SAFETY IS WITHIN REACH 
The recommendation here is that the United States should create a single food 
safety oversight agency (administration) at the Executive Branch, or as an 
alternative, established as an independent agency to create greater transparency. 
Either approach can meet the design of the conceptual model. A single agency can 
become a reality—a well-led agency guided by well-planned regulations, where 
coordinated efforts eliminate gaps in regulatory service and communicate standards for 
sharing information and intelligence seamlessly throughout the food safety regulatory 
chain. The agency would collaborate with both public and private food and agricultural 
stakeholders, and craft solutions for problems created over the years. 
This recommendation sounds simplistic and may give the impression that such a 
change can be made overnight. Of course, it cannot. However, until such a move is 
completed, there will continue to be breakdown in communication between the different 
layers of the food safety regulatory system and ever-branching regulations, statutes, and 
interpretation in the United States. The existing multi-dimensional regulatory system 
continues to cause confusion and has led to diminished consumer confidence in the 
government’s abilities to protect the food supply. Also seen in the eyes of consumers is a 
lack of transparency of the food safety regulatory process. Outbreaks of bacterial 
contamination in different components of the nation’s food supply during the last several 
years have led to this call for change to the U.S. food safety system. 
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A new single food safety/defense oversight agency could deliver long overdue 
change. With open communication, ideas will flow from all parts of the organization and 
each level will play a role in strengthening the system and provide continuous 
improvements that can benefit the whole and improve the food safety and now food 
defense system for years to come. 
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